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University of Florida Law Review
FALL 1974

VOLUME XXVII

NUMBER 1

THE 1974 FLORIDA PROBATE CODEA MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE*
HENRY

A. FEN** and EwvARD F. KoREN***

PART I - INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS

Every thirty to forty years sufficient pressure develops for modernization,
or to use the more popular appellation - reform - to accomplish a major revision of a state's probate laws. 1 Such periodic pressure is not surprising because these laws affect the property rights of a citizen a minimum of three
times in his life - on the death of each of his parents and again on his own
death. On a national scale, evidence of a new ground swell of public concern
was demonstrated by the spectacular success in 1966 of a book entitled How
To Avoid Frobate.2 Other publications carried the same message, or at least a
critical appraisal of existing probate laws.3 Statistical studies showed that the
public was listening to the criticism and taking the advice; in California, more
than sixty per cent of all estates valued between $10,000 to $400,000 were
4
passing outside the probate procedures.
*Copyright 1975 by Henry A. Fenn and Edward F. Koren.
This article will be published in two parts; part II will be published in the University
of FloridaLaw Review, Volume 27, No. 3.
**B.A., 1932, LL.B., 1935, Yale University; Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, University of Florida.
***B.S.BA. 1971, J.D. 1974, University of Florida; Instructor of Law, University of Florida.
1. Two examples of the periodic nature of the modernization of a state's probate laws
are found in New York and Pennsylvania. From 1961 to 1965, New York enacted the first
major reform of its probate laws since the 1928 revisions instituted by the celebrated Foley
Commission. Durant, An Introduction to the Uniform Probate Code, in 1 P-H WS, EsrAT
& TRus'rs U71, at 72 & n.2. This same interval is found in Pennsylvania's 1947 revision of its
probate provisions -the first since 1917. 20 PA. STAT. ANN. at v (Purdon 1950). Showing that
there is always an exception to any generalization, the state enacted a new Probate, Estates
and Fiduciaries Code in 1972 - just 25 years after the 1947 revision. Pa. Act 1972, No. 164.
2. N. DACEy, How To Avom PROBATE (1965). The chief reporter of the Uniform Probate
Code, Richard Wellman, recognized the impact of Dacey's book, observing that initial sales
had exceeded 670,000 and the book headed the nonfiction best seller lists for several months
in 1966. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance,
44 IND. L.J. 191, 192 (1969).
3. E.g., M. BLOOMt, THE TROUBLE wrrH LAWYERS (1968); Bloom, Time To Clean Up Our
Probate Courts, READER's DiGasT, Jan. 1970, at 112; Bloom, The Mess in Our Probate Courts,
READER's DIGEsT, Oct. 1966, at 102; Morgan, The Probate Fuss, LooK, Nov. 29, 1966, at 36;
Taylor, You Can Avoid the ProbateTrap, READER's DioaST, June 1970, at 93.
4. MacKay, Johnson, Birchfield & Redman, A Middle Ground for Reform, 47 FLA. BJ.
439 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MacKay], citing 1964 CAL. ST. INHERrrANCE TAX REP. APPRovEn 42-43, table 22.
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Presaging this latest pressure, the American Bar Association instituted a
program for probate reform in 1962.5 A year later, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws assumed major responsibility for the
project, and in 1969 the joint efforts of these organizations culminated in the
promulgation of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).6
In Florida, a periodic modernization was due by 1973, for the last major
revision of the state's probate laws had occurred in 1933.7 Undoubtedly
spurred by the promulgation of the UPC, there was a rapid transition from
ineffective demands for reform by the public and from within the bar to
affirmative legislative action. The history of this action, which culminated in
unanimous enactment of the 1974 Florida Probate Code (1974 Code),8 is succinctly stated by the chairman of the Florida Bar committee appointed to
study the UPC:
The Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar,
in 1969, considered the Uniform Probate Code while still in draft form,
and appointed me as chairman of the Uniform Probate Code Committee ....
The committee acknowledged that while some sections of the
UPC were controversial and produced mixed feelings within the committee, we approved in principle the UPC. Our study coincided with
the efforts of several legislators to enact the UPC in Florida. The UPC
was introduced as House Bill 997, in the 1973 Florida Legislature. The
Board of Governors of The Florida Bar asked the leaders of the House
and Senate not to pass any probate reform legislation at that session,
but rather to establish a study commission to consider the Uniform
Probate Code and probate reform generally and report to the Legislature prior to the 1974 Regular Session. The result was the creation of
the 14-member Legislative Probate Code Study Commission [Laws of
Florida, ch. 73-307]. The new Florida Probate Code was prepared by
the Legislative Probate Study Commission and is organized, and generally structured along the lines of the UPC, with much of our existing
probate and guardianship law retained but repositioned. 9
This article examines the first five chapters enacted by chapter 74-106,
which are to be known collectively as the Florida Probate Code. 10 These pro5. Uniform Probate Code Approved by Council, 4
206, 207 (1969).

REAL PROPERTY PROBATE & TRUST J.

6. The Commissioners adopted the new Code in August 1969.

NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF

(1969) [hereinafter cited as UPC].
That same month, the ABA House of Delegates gave its approval to the UPC. Association's
House of Delegates Meets in Dallas,55 A.B.A.J. 970, 976 (1969).
7. Fla. Laws 1933, ch. 16,103. This was a complete revision of all the substantive and
procedural laws pertaining to wills. 1 D. REDFEARN, ILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN FLORIDA
§105, at 21 (4th ed. 1971). In 1941, the 1933 Act became part of the Florida Statutes enacted that year. Id.
8. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-106, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §§731.01 et seq. The short title
will be the Florida Probate Code [hereinafter cited as FPC]. FPC §731.01 (1974).
9. Stewart, The FloridaProbateReform Act, 48 FLA. B.J. 546 (1974).
10. FPC §731.01 (1974). Chapter 737, Trust Administration, and chapter 744, Guardianship, are not within the scope of the article, although they were enacted at the same time.
Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-106. Although there are numerous technical and grammatical errors
in chapter 74-106, they are generally not noted in this article. Usually the meaning of the
COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
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visions deal with the substantive laws of wills, intestate succession, and the
administration of decedents' estates. Of the 185 sections of chapters 731
through 735, nineteen may be classified as totally new, sixty-one as derived
from the UPC -some with substantial changes, thirty-two as stemming from
present law but with substantive changes, and the remaining seventy-three
sections as continuations of present law with only editorial changes. Comparisons are made to both current law and the recommendations of the UPC,
especially regarding the important changes in Florida law. While many of the
unchanged provisions are not analyzed, two appendices are included for the
convenience of the reader, listing the reposition of sections of the current law
in the 1974 Code, the source from which each section of the 1974 Code seems
to be derived, and where reference is made to it in this article. Finally, certain
amendments to the new law are recommended, which the authors believe
will help clarify some of the changes or more fully realize desirable objectives.
THE

UPC's APPROACH

TO REFOPi

Beginning in 1942, research directed toward probate reform was undertaken in connection with the Model Probate Code.'- An examination of the
results shows that the existing state statutes were permeated with evidence of
legislative paternalism and parochialism.1 2 The paternalism is illustrated by
the close court supervision required for the administration of estates, exemplified by numerous procedural devices designed to protect the beneficiaries and
creditors of an estate. The parochialism is evidenced first by the limitation of
the personal representative's authority to the state of his appointment, thus
requiring administration in each state where assets are found. A second aspect
of parochialism is the lack of uniformity in the laws of the various states,
which frequently results in major disruptions of estate plans when a testator
moves from one state to another.
Recent empirical studies support the conclusion of paternalism. 3 The
most recent of these was conducted in Cleveland in 1965-1966 and showed that
the substantive laws of wealth transmission did not reflect the desires of the
average decedent.1 4 Moreover, it also demonstrated that in the majority of

statute is clear despite the errors, and, in any event, the Probate Commission has prepared
a list of these errors for correction by the 1975 legislature.
11. Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America, 42 MICH. L.
REv. 965, 43 Mica. L. REv. 113 (1944); Simes & Basye, The Function of Will Contests, 44
MiCH. L. REv. 503 (1946). The same articles appear in L. SiMEs & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN
PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A IODEL PROBATE CODE 385, 682 (1946).

12. L. SimEs & P. BASYE, supra note 11, at 241-375 (app. A) (containing a statistical
compilation of the then existing state statutes); Monographs on Problems in Probate Law,
id. (pt. 3), at 383-756. See generally T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS (1953).
13. See M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERrrANCE (1970) !(study
of Cleveland, Ohio); Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission
at Death, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 241 (1963) (study of Chicago, Illinois). Although not referring
to these studies, the chief reporter of the UPC reached the same conclusion. Wellman, The
Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REv. 453, 455 (1970).
14. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMIrrH, supra note 13, at 298-99.
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instances the protections accorded to beneficiaries and creditors are unneeded.15 Thus, as four Florida legislators concluded:
The Cleveland experience also tells us that probate procedures have
little real meaning for creditors of decedents, that claims are rarely, if
ever, made on bonds, that most beneficiaries do not contest wills or
present competing claims and that the likelihood of inheritance by
minors is more remote than normally anticipated. 16
In other words, the cost of the procedures in many instances outweighs the
protections accorded. Therein lies the basis for the many criticisms that have
been levied against the probate system in recent years and for the increasing
7
use of devices for avoiding probate.
The draftsmen of the UPC responded to this criticism with recommendations for both substantive and procedural reform. Although much of the
commentary on the UPC has focused on its procedural aspects,18 perhaps just
as important in terms of the law reflecting the desires of the average citizen
are the recommended changes in the substantive law of succession. Both the
procedural and substantive provisions reflect what may be characterized as the
UPC's six major objectives. These are:
(1) to modernize the rules of intestate succession and thereby "provide
suitable rules ... for the person of modest means who relies on the estate
plan provided by law"; 9
(2) to provide an elective share system "designed to protect a spouse of
a decedent who was a domiciliary against donative transfers by will and
will substitutes which
would deprive the survivor of a 'fair share' of the
20
decedent's estate";

(3) to simplify the requirements of will execution in order to restore
the will2 "to its role as the major instrument for disposition of wealth at
death"; 1
(4) to decrease the amount of court supervision required for the administration of estates by providing "persons interested in decedent's
estates with as little or as much by way of procedural and
22 adjudicative
safeguards as may be suitable under varying circumstances";
(5) to increase uniformity of the probate law throughout the country
and thereby "reduce the problems of planning via wills for persons who
own property in several states"; 23 and

(6) to reduce the need for multiple administration of estates by per15. Id. at 298.
16. MacKay, supra note 4, at 439.
17. Wellman, supra note 13, at 454; Wellman, supra note 2, at 191-94. See notes 2-3
supra and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Stroup, Probate Practice Under the Uniform Probate Code, 46 N.D.L. RlEv.
289 (1970); Wellman, supra note 2; Wellman, supra note 13; Note, The Uniform Probate
Code - A Refreshing Approach to ProbateReform, 46 N.D.L. REV. 327 (1970).
19. UPC, art. 2, pt. 1, General Comment.

20. UPC, art. 2, pt. 2, General Comment.
21.

UPC, art. 2, pt. 5, General Comment.

22. UPC, art. 3, General Comment.
23.

Wellman, supra note 2, at 201.
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mitting "unified administration of decedent's24estates located in several
states under the law of the decedent's domicile."
While these are seemingly idealistic goals, it should be noted that the
draftsmen who devised them were, for the most part, practitioners who had
experienced the inadequacies of the existing laws.2 5 Their experiences were
bolstered by the empirical data of the will studies that also revealed many
20
problems.
An example of how these studies were the foundation for many of the
UPC provisions is seen in its "statutory estate plan."27 It is a general belief
that the intestacy laws should provide for distribution of property in a manner most similar to that which an intestate would have provided had he left a
properly executed will.2S The will studies showed, however, that the typical
laws of intestacy failed to satisfy this goal. 29 These studies first established the
characteristics of the average intestate,30 and then examined the wills of decedents with similar characteristics. By inference, the probable intentions of the
average intestate were thus established.2 1 Armed with these data, the drafters
of the UPC were able to devise a plan of intestate succession that more closely
approximated these intentions. In so doing, they "reject[ed] the feature of existing law which tends to compel every married person to make a will or em32
ploy a will substitute."
Most of the other objectives also responded to shortcomings of the existing laws that were exposed both by the will studies and the draftsmen's
experience in practice. Although in at least one instance the recommendation
seems to be more a "solution in search of a problem, ' 33 as a whole, the UPC
is a well designed method of modernizing the nation's probate laws and procedures that "should tend to reduce pressures on persons of modest means
24. Wellman, How the Uniform Probate Code Deals with Estates that Cross State Lines,
J. 159 (1970).
25. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, OFFICIAL TEXT xxiii-xxv (West 1970).
26. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
27. Wellman, Selected Aspects of Uniform Probate Code, 3 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE &
TRUST J. 199, 204 (1968).
28. See Dunham, supra note 13, at 241 & n.1.
29. Dunham, supra note 13, at 258-63; see M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES g-D. SMrrH, supra note
13, at 293-99.
30. The average intestate was found to be younger, M. SUSSmAN, J. CATES & D. SMrrH,
supra note 13, at 65; Dunham, supra note 13, at 279; less wealthy, M. SUSSmAN, J. CATrs &=
D. SMrrH, supra at 73; Dunham, supra at 264; more likely to be single, M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES
& D. SMrrH, supra at 70; and of a lower social or occupational status than a testate decedent,
M. SussiAN, J. CATES &D. SrrH, supra at 76-77; Dunham, supra at 248.
31. O'Connell & Effland, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of the
Law of Arizona and the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARiz. L. REv. 205, 209 (1972); Curry,
5 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRusT

Intestate Succession and Wills: A ComparativeAnalysis of Article II of the Uniform Probate
Code and the Law of Ohio, 34 Oino ST. L.J. 114, 116 (1973).
32. Wellman, supra note 2, at 200.
33. Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33
U. Cm. L. REv. 681 (1966). Although the author was referring to dower laws in general, the
UPC's elective share provisions seem to merit the same characterization. See text accompanying notes 246-272 infra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

to make wills or avoid probate." 34 As the individual provisions of the 1974
Code are examined, their success in attaining this goal, as well as the six major
objectives of the UPC, will be considered.
INTESTATE SUCCESSION

The new provisions governing intestate succession are to a large degree
based upon the "statutory estate plan" 35 of the UPC. This plan was promulgated "to reflect the normal desire of the owner of wealth as to disposition of
his property at death," 36 and thereby "provide suitable rules ... for the person
of modest means who relies on the estate plan provided by law." 3 7 To this
end, it is designed to reflect four somewhat competing considerations: (1) the
results of recent empirical studies showing the average married person wants
most, if not all, of his property to pass to the surviving spouse;38 (2) the desire
of many legislatures to protect children from possible disinheritance by the
spouse; 39 (3) the desirability in larger estates of reducing estate taxes by
maximizing the marital deduction; 40 and (4) the wish to avoid in smaller
34. Wellman, supra note 2, at 200 (emphasis in original).
35. Wellman, supra note 27, at 204.
36. UPC, art. 2, pt. 1, General Comment.
37. Id. As noted earlier, the draftsmen of the Uniform Probate Code were heavily influenced in their development of the statutory estate plan by the results of the Cleveland
and Chicago will studies, which showed that the typical intestacy laws did not "reflect the
normal desire" of the average citizen concerning the disposition of his property at death. See
text accompanying notes 27-32 supra. For example, most married testators left most, if not
all, of their property to the surviving spouse instead of treating the survivor as one of the
children. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
38. M. SUSSIMAN, J. CATES & D. SITI, supra note 13, at 289-91; Durham, supra note 13,
at 253. For a fuller discussion of these studies, see text accompanying notes 27-32 supra. See
Mulder, Intestate Succession Under the Uniform Probate Code, 3 PROSPECTUS 301, 312 (1970);
O'Connell & Efland, supra note 31, at 210.
39. Mulder, supra note 38, at 313-15. The author believes that such a "blanket attitude
of distrust" is inappropriate, and that the entire estate should pass to the surviving spouse,
with the probate judge vested with the power to require the spouse to "post bond or, if
necessary, give the children an immediate share in the estate." Id. at 315. This, however, poses
several problems in taxation. First, as the author recognizes, it will result in double taxation
of the estate ultimately passing to the children. Id. at 316-17; see note 40 infra. In addition,
it is possible that the judge's power to divest the spouse of a part of the estate would make
that portion a "terminable interest" and thereby disqualify it from the marital deduction.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2056(b). But see TRExs. REc. §§20.2056(b)-l(g), ex. 8.
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2056. The marital deduction allows the decedent's taxable
estate to be reduced by the value of the interest passing to the surviving spouse, up to a
maximum deduction of 50% of the adjusted gross estate. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2056.
This maximum would never be realized under current Florida law if the intestate left more
than one child. The spouse would either share equally with the children or claim a onethird dower interest in the estate. In either event, a portion of the allowable deduction
would be lost.
On the other hand, if the statute followed the will studies, see text accompanying notes
27-32 supra, passing most or all of the estate to the surviving spouse, part of the children's
ultimate shares would be subject to double taxation. First, the half not allowed as a marital
deduction would be taxed in the intestate's estate and then the entire estate would be taxed
again on the death of the survivor. By providing that the survivor receives just over one-half
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estates the expense and restrictions of guardianship for minors.41
In some instances, however, existing Florida law has been retained, even

when in conflict with the UPC. This reflects an effort to minimize changes
unsupported by persuasive data. For instance, the system of inheriting per

stirpes remains, 42 although the UPC recommends per capita distribution with
representation;4 3 and the half-blood heir continues to receive only a half share
44
unless all heirs are of the half-blood.
The Surviving Spouse and Lineal Descendants

The major operative sections relating to intestacy represent a decided
change in Florida law, especially with regard to the surviving spouse and
children.45 The share of the surviving spouse depends upon whether a lineal
descendant of the decedent also survives, and, if so, whether all of the lineal
of the estate, see text accompanying notes 45-55 infra, this double taxation is reduced. For
example, if an intestate had a taxable estate of $200,000 (before the marital deduction), and
$100,000 passed to the surviving spouse, each estate would have a tax liability of $20,700, or
a total of $41,400. On the other hand, if the entire estate passed to the survivor, there would
still be a tax of $20,700 on the intestate's estate; however, assuming no other changes, the
total tax liability would be substantially increased. The survivor's taxable estate now would be
$179,300 ($200,000 less the $20,700 tax paid), which would result in a tax liability of $44,490.
Aggregating these two amounts, the total liability for both estates would be $65,190-an increase of $23,790.
41. Mulder, supra note 38, at S14. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
42. Compare FPC §732.104 (1970), with FLA. STAT. §731.25 (1973).
43. UPC §2-106.
44. Compare FPC §732.105 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.24 (1973). Section 2-107 of the
UPC provides for equal shares in all events, eliminating the discrimination against halfbloods as a "vestige of another era," when the rule was promulgated for evidentiary purposes.
O'Connell & Effland, supra note 31, at 223. As these authors observe:
"Since the distinction between whole- and half-bloods is not needed as an evidentiary tool,
there would appear to be no rational basis for its continuation. It is anomalous to confine
a relative of the half-blood to a half-share but to give a relative who is adopted and has no
blood relationship at all a full share [see text accompanying notes 70-86 infra]." Id.
The section on escheat also remains largely the same, although the new section eliminates
procedural provisions and provides that the amount to which a subsequent bona fide claimant
is entitled shall be repaid with interest. FPC §732.107 (1974). It also shortens the time for
filing claims from 20 years to 10 years. Compare FPC §732.107(4) (1974), with FLA. STAT.
§731.33(4) (1973).
45. The first step in the new method of succession simply provides that "any part of
the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed of by will passes to the heirs . . . [by
intestacy]." FPC §732.101 (1974). FPC §731.201(9) defines "estate" as "property of a decedent that is the subject of administration." Although a statutory definition of "intestate
estate" is new to Florida law, it is merely a codification of existing case law. E.g., In re
Stephan's Estate, 142 Fla. 88, 194 So. 343 (1940); Sorrels v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 105 So.
106 (1925); Crolly v. Clark, 20 Fla. 849 (1884).
Like Florida law since 1933, no distinction has been made between real and personal
property in the intestate estate; but instead of continuing the interchangeable use of certain
terms, such as devise and bequest, the 1974 Code simply defines "devise" as referring to both
real and personal property and therefore including the use of the word "bequest." FPC
§731.201(6) (1974). In a similar fashion, several other historical terminologies have been
eliminated from the new statute.
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descendants are also lineal descendants of that spouse. 46 If there is no surviving
lineal descendant, there is no change in the existing law - the spouse takes the
entire intestate estate. 47 If lineal descendants do survive, however, the 1974
Code assures the spouse of considerably more than merely "taking ... as if he
or she were one of the children."'411 Thus, if all of the lineal descendants are
the descendants of the survivor's marriage to the decedent, the surviving
spouse takes the first $20,000 plus one-half of the balance of the estate; 49 the
remaining one-half is divided among their lineal descendants per stirpes. 0
When one or more of the surviving lineal descendants is not a lineal descendant of the spouse, as in the case of a second marriage, 51 the spouse still takes
one-half of the estate although the initial $20,000 share is eliminated. Again,
the remaining half is divided per stirpes52 among all lineal descendants.
Judging from the will studies, this statutory plan more closely approximates the intentions of the average owner of a small estate than does existing
law. 53 In larger estates, the plan guarantees the maximum use of the marital
deduction with the minimum of double taxation of the children's ultimate

46. FPC §732.102 (1974). The UPC added a third contingency - whether the decedent
was survived by parents, if there were no surviving lineal descendants. UPC §2-102(2). This
provision was apparently designed to return a portion of the estate to the parents in situations where they were the major contributors to the estate of a recently married decedent,
or, in cases of marriages of longer duration, to allow the decedent's own blood line to retain
part of the estate. Mulder, supra note 38, at 313.
47. Compare FPC §732.102(l)(a) (1974), with FI.A. STAT. §731.23(2) (1973).
48. FLA. STAT. §731.23(1) (1973). The new statute gives the surviving spouse at least
one-half of the estate, see text accompanying notes 49-52 infra, which will be an increase in
all cases where there is more than one surviving lineal descendant.
49. FPC §732.102(l)(b) (1974). The UPC suggested that the initial share be $50,000,
UPC §2-102; a figure apparently derived from the fact that the majority of wills in the
Chicago study, which devised the entire estate to the surviving spouse, involved estates of
$50,000 or less. See Dunham, supra note 13, at 250; cf. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH,
supra note 13, at 173.
50. FPC §732.103 provides, inter alia, "[t]he part of the intestate estate not passing to
the surviving spouse under §732.102 F.S ....
descends as follows:
"(1) to the lineal descendants of the decedent ....
" Of course, if there is no surviving
spouse, then the entire amount passes to the lineal descendants as under existing law. Compare FPC §§732.102-.103, with FLA. STAT. §732.23(3) (1973). In either event, FPC §732.104
provides that this inheritance shall be per stirpes.
51. An illegitimate child of the decedent could also present this situation. See text accompanying notes 87-94 infra.
52. FPC §732.102(1)(c) (1974). See note 50 supra.
53. See text accompanyng notes 27-32 supra. Based on these same studies, however, it has
been argued that the provisions do not go far enough; that the spouse should receive the
entire property when all of the surviving heirs are lineals of the marriage. See note 39 supra.
While most of the wills examined did indeed provide such a disposition, it should be remembered that they disposed of relatively small estates, generally less than $50,000. Dunham,
supra note 13, at 260. Cf. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, supra note 13, at 173. Even with
the legislature's reduction of the spouse's initial share from $50,000 to $20,000, see note 49
supra and accompanying text, the Florida plan allows the decedent to leave a fairly substantial estate before this initial share is exhausted. Also, in the not unusual situation of a
decedent leaving little else but a home and substantial insurance payable to the surviving
spouse, the spouse will receive the entire estate. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
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shares.5 4 The need for guardianships will be reduced also, for with the 1974
Code's increased amount of exempt property and larger family allowance,
there could well be a net estate of approximately $32,000 before lineal descendants begin to share. 55 In view of these advantages and the obvious alternative of a will if the decedent is not satisfied with the statutory plan, the new
provisions seem to be a decided improvement in Florida law.
The Parentsand CollateralHeirs
The provisions governing the intestate shares of the decedent's other

natural heirs are merely edited versions of our existing statutes.56 Parents

share only if no spouse or lineal descendant survives. 57 If no parent survives,
the estate passes to the brothers and sisters of the decedent and the descendants
of deceased brothers and sisters;5 s if none of these survives the decedent, the
estate is divided into moieties that descend to the paternal and maternal grand-

parents or their descendants.5 9 At this point, rather than continuing the
search for takers to great grandparents and their descendants, as in the
present statute, the new law passes the estate immediately to the kindred of
the last deceased spouse of the intestate. 60 In the unlikely event that neither
54. See note 40 supra.
55. Section 732.401 of the 1974 Code continues the provision for a homestead exemption
mandated by article X, §4 of the Florida constitution. See text accompanying notes 224-227
infra. In addition, the provisions for exempt property and a family allowance have been
increased to allow the spouse to take up to $5,000 of household furnishings, $1,000 of personal effects, and $6,000 as a family allowance. Compare FPC §§732A02-A03 (1974), with
FLA. STAT. §§731.36, 733.20(d) (1973), and see text accompanying notes 227-230 infra. Thus,
the surviving spouse may take $6,000 of exempt property under FPC §732A02, a $6,000
family allowance under FPC §732.403, and the first $20,000 of the remaining estate under
FPC §732.102(i)(b). Therefore, the intestate could leave an estate of $32,000 before the lineal
descendants begin to share and if homestead of life insurance payable to the spouse is considered, the initial share could be quite large. It should be noted, however, that these new
provisions increasing the exempt property and family allowance may be constitutionally invalid. See text accompanying notes 227-230, 235 infra.
56. The provisions governing the order of succession of collaterals also coincide with
those recommended by the UPC. Compare FPC §732.103 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.23
(1973) and UPC §2-103.
57. If both parents survive, they share equally in the estate, otherwise the survivor succeeds to the entire estate. FPC §732.103(2) (1974). As noted earlier, under the UPC the
parents would also share in the estate if the decedent left a spouse, but no lineal descendants.
See note 46 supra.

58. FPC §732.103(3) (1974).
59. FPC §732.103(4) (1974). A statutory anomaly becomes apparent at this point where
the legislature has tried to prevent the escheat of half of the estate where there was no
kindred of one side. Although expressed differently, both §§(4)(c) and (5) of FPC §732.103
provide that the entire estate descends to the other side in this situation. This redundancy
should be corrected by deleting the first sentence of §5 and amending the second to read
" While there is no difference in the meaning of
simply: "If none of the foregoing . - ...
the two provisions, this change is suggested to maintain consistency and to avoid the insertion of outdated language in the statute.
,-.60. Compare FPC §732.103(5). (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§731.23(6)(c), (d) (1973). This
provision is similar to the last sentence of §732.23(7) and is :iworthy addition to the UPC
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the decedent nor his last deceased wife left kindred within the required degree, the estate escheats.61
The elimination from the inheritance scheme of relatives more remote
than descendants of first cousins - the so-called "laughing heirs" - follows the
UPC and seems desirable. 2 Similar proposals have been made in the past, 63
but historical precedent and distaste for escheat have impeded their adoption.
The latter objection is somewhat obviated by passing the estate to the kindred
of the last deceased spouse, thus reducing the escheat possibility. The historical objective of "keeping the property in the family" has diminished in
importance with the increased mobility of our society and the con-esponding
reduction in close relationships among remote relatives.64 Indeed, it is likely
that the decedent had closer contacts with his deceased wife's nearer relatives
than with his own remote kindred. Because these provisions also lessen the
likelihood of expensive and time-consuming searches for remote heirs and
reduce the number of possible contestants of a will - important advantages
to both the decedent and his intended beneficiaries- - they are a laudable
modernization of the law of inheritance by collaterals.66
Status of Special Heirs
In any complete succession plan, there must be provisions for less usual
familial relationships - the half-blood, the illegitimate, the adopted child, the

proposal. See UPC §2-103. In order to avoid problems arising when the decedent's "last
deceased spouse" has left a will, this provision should be amended to read: "[Als if the deceased spouse has survived the intestate and then (lied intestate entitled to the estate." In
this manner it would pass without question to the spouse's intestate successors rather than
to the testamentary beneficiaries.
61. FPC §732.107 (1974). See note 44 supra.
62. See UPC §2-103, Comment. That this was the desire of most decedents is supported
by the Chicago will study. Dunham, supra note 13, at 255, 263.
63. See Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20 IowA L.
REv. 203, 208-09 (1935).
64. Curry, supra note 31, at 120-21; Mulder, supra note 38, at 230.
65. O'Connell & Eftland, supra note 31, at 215. By eliminating the remote collaterals,
the possible contestants to a will are also reduced, for any heir has an interest in a will and
may therefore contest it. See FLA. STAT. §732.30 (1973).
66. Thus, to a large degree, the adoption of the "statutory estate plan" should eliminate
much of the criticism of the current intestacy laws. There is one remaining problem, however, that is ignored by both the UPC and the 1974 Code. Under either plan, if a child
predeceases the decedent, the spouse of the child is not provided for, contrary to the apparent desires of most testators. See Dunham, supra note 13, at 254. One commentator has
suggested that this be remedied by including a provision giving the deceased child's share
to the spouse, if the spouse has not married. Mulder, supra note 38, at 321. If the couple
were childless, such a proposal deserves consideration as a method of more closely reflecting
the intentions of the average decedent. If the predeceased child has left issue, however, the
author's further proposal that Ihe spouse serve as a substitute for the issue has less merit,
for there is the possibility that the issue will be disinherited by the spouse. Therefore, only
if the predeceased child left no issue should the legislature give consideration to substituting
the child's spouse in his stead as a means of completing the succession hierarchy without
extending it to the laughing heirs.
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afterborn heir, and the alien.67 The UPC suggests treating them the same in
all respects as the natural heirs.68 With the exception of retaining the half
share for the half-blood, 69 the 1974 Code generally follows this recommendation and language.
The status of the adopted child is covered in section 732.108(1). The intended purpose of the Code is to make a complete substitution of families for
inheritance purposes3 0 To the extent this is accomplished, present law will be
altered in several respects. First, the adopted child will not be able to inherit
from his natural parents or other natural relatives. 71 On the other hand, he
12
will be able to inherit from adoptive relatives beyond brothers and sisters
While the intent of the 1974 Code is clear, the language used is not
felicitous. It elected to state the matter thus:
If a relationship of parent and child, for purposes of intestate succession, must be established to determine succession by, through, or from a
person,

(1) An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of
the natural parents of [sic -should read "or"] of any prior adoptive
parents except that adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural
parent has no7 3effect on the relationship between the child and that
parent.

natural

As long as the problem is to determine intestate succession between the
adopted and adopting parties, the statute seems clear - "an adopted person
is the child of an adopting parent" -and is a continuation of our present
law.7 4 Nor is there a problem with succession between the adopted child and
his natural parents - "an adopted person is... not [the child] of the natural
parents." 7 This continues our present law that the natural parents cannot

67. Because the latter two affect wills as well as intestate succession they are discussed
later. See text accompanying notes 310-315, 347-349 infra.
68. UPC §§2-107, -109, -112. See also UPC §2-109, Comment.
69. FPC §732.105 (1974). See note 44 supra.
70. See UPC, art. 2, pt. 1, General Comment.
71. See text accompanying notes 73-76 infra.
72. See text accompanying notes 73, 77-86 infra.
73. FPC §732.108(1) (1974). Under the statutory plan of the UPC, this is not the only
provision affecting adopted children. Indeed, it has been observed that it is necessary to
"construe as many as seven provisions in the [UPC] to resolve ... [the status of the adopted
child]." Lilly, The Uniform Probate Code and Oklahoma Law: A Comparison, 8 TULSA L.
159, 168 (1972). The seven provisions include: three definitional sections, 1-201(3) (defining
"child"); 1-201(21) (defining "issue'); and 1-201(28) (defining "parent"); two provisions providing the order of succession, §§2-102, -103; the section concerning representation, §2-106;
and the actual section relating specifically to adopted persons, 2-109(1). The legislature, however, adopted neither the definitional sections nor the modified provisions dealing with the
order of succession and representation. Because of these omissions, which leave several gaps
in the actual adopted child provision, the possibility is even greater that the intent of the
legislature will not be followed. See text accompanying notes 81-86 infra.
74. See FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1973).
75. FPC §732.108(1) (1974).
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inherit from the child after adoption, but changes existing law that allows
76
the child to inherit from them.
When succession by or from other parties is involved, however, the language of the statute is open to different interpretations. As one commentator
observed:
If the "by, through, or from" language in this provision is given its
"fullest effect," it seems reasonable to conclude that .. . "natural" relationships are created by law for the77adoptee as if he had been a
"natural" child of his adopting parents.
Nevertheless, other conclusions can be reached.78 Technically an heir can
never inherit "through" another person, but must always take in his own
right; that is, he must fit the statutory wording describing the takers. In the
new statute, he must be a "lineal descendant" of the decedent, a brother or
sister, a descendant of a deceased brother or sister, et cetera.7- Only after it
has thus been determined that a person is entitled to share in an intestate
estate is a determination of whether he takes "through" another important in
determining the size of the share to wtich he is entitled. 80
Had the Florida courts not shown a predilection for strict construction
of the intestacy provisions concerning the status of adopted children, these
distinctions would be of less importance. But in a line of cases, of which In re
Hewett's Estate,"1 is the most noted, they have adhered to:
[T]he traditional "blood of the blood-bone of the bone" view of succession, thereby generating a hybrid complex of inheritance rights that
stigmatize the adoptee as a second class citizen.82

76. FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1973). The new provision is not applicable if the natural parent
is the spouse of the adopting parent. FPC §732.108(1) (1974). It is unclear, however, whether
the inheritance rights by or from other natural relatives are similarly abolished. If so, this
also departs from existing law. See In re Estate of Levy, 141 So. 2d 803 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962),
in which the court allowed the decedent's natural sister and the children of a natural
brother to share in his estate, even though both the sister and the brother had been adopted
by others. The rationale was that the current statute, FLA. STAT. §731.30, was a grant of
rights to the adopted child and did not imply that adoption should abolish rights that previously existed. The precedential value of the decision under the 1974 Code is considerably
lessened, however, by the court's statement that "the purpose of §731.30 would not be defeated by allowing the appellants to inherit from their natural kindred." 141 So. 2d at 806.
The current law allows the child to inherit from the natural parents, while the new provision expressly provides otherwise. Compare FPC §732.108(1) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.30
(1973).
77. Lilly, supra note 73, at 169 (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. at 169 n,72.
79. See FPC §732.103 (1974).
80. This distinction has been recognized in Florida, at least in dictum. See In re Estate
of Davol, 100 So. 2d 188, 190 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
81. 153 Fla. 137, 13 So. 2d 904 (1943). See also In re Estate of Levy, 141 So. 2d 803 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1962); In re Poole's Estate, 53 Fla. 610, 15 So. 2d 323 (1943).
82. Smith & Fawsett, Florida Adoption and Intestate Succession Laws: A Legal Paralogism, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 603, 610 (1972).
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This adherence to the traditional view has been accomplished in spite of
statutory language seemingly to the contrary,8 3 on the ground that the statutes
did not "expressly make the adopted child the heir at law or lineal descendant
of the ancestors or blood kindred of the adoptive parents."' 4 This same argument could be advanced to continue the Hewett result under the new statute.
The success of such an argument is even more likely because the new statute
fails to include the sections of the UPC defining "child" and "parent" that
seem necessary to interpret the adoption provision. 85 Therefore, the legislature
should amend this section and leave no doubt about its intent to effectuate a
86
complete transposition of families for the adopted child.
83. Prior to 1973, §731.30 provided: "[A]n adopted child, whether adopted under the
laws of Florida or any other state or country, shall be an heir at law, and for the purpose
of inheritance, shall be regarded as a lineal descendant of his adopting parents .... " FYA.
STAT. §731.30 (1971). Section 63.151 provided: "By any judgment or decree of adoption, the
child shall be the child and legal heir of the adopting parent or parents, entitled to all
rights and privileges, and subject to all obligations, of a child born to such parent or
parents in lawful wedlock." FLA. STAT. §63.151 (1971). As one commentary has observed,
however: "These statutes through judicial construction . . . have been determined to mean:
(1) the adoptee inherits from all his natural (blood) kindred including his natural parents;
(2) all the natural (blood) kindred except the natural parents inherit from the adoptee;
(3) within the adoptive family, intestate succession is strictly limited to inheritance by and
from the adoptee, his adopted parents, and the natural and adopted children of the adoptive
parents. The adoptee may not inherit by intestacy from any other adopted kindred." Smith
& Fawsett, supra note 82, at 609 (emphasis in original).
84. In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 140, 13 So. 2d 904, 906 (1943) (emphasis in
original).
85. The comment to the UPC section says: "The definition of 'child' and 'parent' in
Section 1-201 incorporates the meaning established in this section thus extending them for
all purposes of the Code." UPC §2-109, Comment. Perhaps by omitting the definitions of
"child" and "parent" from the definitional section of the Florida Code, the legislature intended to prevent adopted children from being treated as natural children for purposes
other than intestate succession, such as will interpretation. Nevertheless, the omission still
poses interpretation problems because of the use of undefined language in FPC §732.108.
Moreover, the order of succession statute refers to lineal descendants, not issue, as in the
UPC. Thus, it becomes even more plausible for a successful argument to be made that
§732.108, by proving that the adopted person is a child rather than a lineal descendant,
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parent.
86. To best achieve this result the authors recommend that FPC §732.108 be amended
and that two sections be adopted instead of the present one. This would also involve a renumbering of present FPC §§732.109-.111. The suggested statutes would read as follows:
732.108 Adopted persons.- For the purpose of intestate succession by or from an
adopted person, the adopted person is a lineal descendant of an adopting parent and a
natural kindred of all members of the adopting parent's family mentioned in section
732.103 and is not a lineal descendant of his natural parents nor a kindred of any member of his natural family or of any prior adoptive family, except that adoption of a
child by the spouse of the natural parent has no effect on the relationship between the
child and that parent or that parent's family.
732.109 Persons barn out of wedlock. - In cases not covered by section 732.108, a person

born out of wedlock is a lineal descendant of the mother and a kindred of all members
of the mother's family mentioned in section 732.103. The person is also a lineal descendant of the father and a kindred of all members of the father's family mentioned in
section 732.103, if: (a) the natural parents participate in a marriage ceremony, before or
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The status of illegitimates is covered in subsection (2) of 732.108, and is
therefore subject to the same uncertainty as to its application as is the provision for adopted children87 Otherwise, there has been little substantive
change. ss A person born out of wedlock apparently continues to be the heir of
the mother, although the language has been altered to read that the person
is the "child of a [sic] mother" 89 - again, without defining "child." The illegitimate is also considered the "child" of the father if the natural parents
married before or after the child's birth, or "the paternity is established by
an adjudication." 90 The former provision is largely a continuation of present
law; 91 the latter is a substitution for the current provision allowing the father
to acknowledge himself in a writing signed in the presence of a competent
witness.9 2 Nevertheless, the change is probably inconsequential, because an adjudication presumably could be obtained after the death of the father on the
93
basis of such writing.

after the birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or (b) the
paternity is established by an adjudication.
For reasons discussed in the text accompanying notes 87-96 infra, the latter subsection
should be further amended to read:
(b) the paternity is established by an adjudication, except that paternity so established
is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from the child unless the
father has openly treated the child as his, and has not refused to support the child.
87. See text accompanying notes 77-86 supra.
88. Compare FPC §732.108(2) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1973). In 1968 two
Supreme Court decisions held that a state wrongful death statute could not discriminate
among beneficiaries solely on the basis of legitimacy. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In the wake of these decisions, several courts held that all classifications based on illegitimacy were constitutionally
invalid. E.g., Munn v. Munn, 450 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1969) (support); In re Estate of Jensen,
162 NAV.2d 861 (N.D. 1968) (inheritance). It is doubtful, however, if this prohibition extends to either the current or new provisions concerning inheritance. Neither section makes
a classification between legitimates and illegitimates; rather, these sections establish that all
children have the right to inherit equally from their natural parents, and merely provide
evidentiary requirements necessary for the proof of paternity. For a detailed discussion of
this problem, see Note, Uniform Probate Code- Illegitimacy- Inheritance and the Illegitimate: A Model for Probate Reform, 69 MicH. L. REv. 112 (1970).
89. FPC §732.108(2) (1974).
90. Id. Paternity is considered established if "[t]he natural parents participated in a
marriage ceremony before or after birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage
is void .... " FPC §732.108(2)(a) (1974).
91. A child either conceived or born in lawful wedlock is legitimate. E.g., IlIgen v.
Carter, 123 So. 2d 368 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Sanders v. Yancey, 122 So. 2d 202 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1960). In fact, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that children born in wedlock
are presumed to be legitimate and the fact that the child was conceived out of wedlock and
that the marriage of its parents was annulled before its birth did not overcome the presumption. In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 32 So. 2d 840 (1947). FLA. STAT. §742.091 (1973) currently provides that the subsequent marriage of the natural parents legitimatizes the child
for all purposes.
92. FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1973).
93. The phrase of the UPC requiring the adjudication to be made "before the death of
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As enacted, the new section has at least one potential failing, in addition
to the uncertainty of the scope of its application because of the introductory
sentence of the section.94 The legislature eliminated a portion of the UPC
provision that negated any adjudication that would "qualify the father or his
kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly
treated the child as his, and has not refused to support the child." 95 The
reasons for this elimination are not dear, for certainly the policy of the provision is to encourage acknowledgement and support. The failure of the
legislature to include this provision would conceivably allow a father to postpone acknowledgement until it would benefit him. For this reason, the deleted language should be reinserted.6
WILLS

The will provisions of the 1974 Code" contain no dramatic changes comparable to the "statutory estate plan" for intestacy. While following the structure of the UPC, the provisions for the most part are taken, with editorial
changes, from existing law. Two desirable recommendations of the UPC were
adopted,9 but many others of equal desirability were either overlooked or
deliberately rejected.99
Execution
As under current law, any person of sound mind over 18 years of age may
make a will.100 The required formalities, however, have undergone several
changes, although not enough to modernize this area of the law. It has been
pointed out that once the law has granted the power to make a will, the law
and the courts should favor giving effect to an intended exercise of that power;
that formalities of execution should be limited to those needed to assure that
the testamentary power was intended to be exercised; and that such requirements "surely should not be revered as ends in themselves, enthroning formality over frustrated intent."''1 It also should be recalled that our requirements
for execution stem almost without change from the original Statute of Frauds
and that the formalities needed to assure effectuation of a testator's intent in
England in 1676 may be quite unnecessary in contemporary society. 02 After
the father," UPC §2-109(2)(ii), has been omitted in the 1974 Code, suggesting that this determination can be made at any time.
94. See text accompanying notes 73-86 supra.
95. UPC §2-109(2)(ii).
96. See note 86 supra for a suggested statute.
97. Although only part 5 of chapter 732 is entitled "Wills," provisions concerning a
pretermitted spouse or child are discussed here because they are concerned solely with
testamentary dispositions.
98. See text accompanying notes 126-135, 150-153 infra.
99. See text accompanying notes 120-125, 158-162 infra.
100. Compare FPC §732.501 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.04 (1973).
101. Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YArE L.J. 1, 2 (1942).
102. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
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carefully weighing these and other criticisms of current probate law, the UPC
draftsmen conclude: "If the will is to be restored to its role as the major instrument for the disposition of wealth at death, its execution must be kept
3
simple."10
Unfortunately, this goal is not realized by the 1974 Code. Nuncupative
wills are abolished'0 4 and the UPC's express recognition of holographic wills °5
is rejected. As a result, Florida law will now require that every will or codicill6o be in writing and that the testator:
Must sign his will at the end or acknowledge his signature to it or some
other person in his presence and by his direction must subscribe the
testator's name to it, in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses
present at the same time.107

The retention of the requirement that the will be signed "at the end"
perhaps may be supported by the normality of signing in this position, as well
as its evidentiary value in showing a completed document, 10 8 but the UPC
chose on balance to eliminate the requirement. 0 9 It is even more difficult to
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
103. UPC art. 2, pt. 5, General Comment.
104. Section 732.502 provides: "Every will must be in writing and executed as follows . . ." (emphasis added). Current law expressly provides for nuncupative wills, in both
§731.07, "[e]very will, other than a nuncupative will" and in §731.06 (requisites of nuncupative wills). This abolition of nuncupative wills is in accord with the UPC (see UPC §2-502)
and is applauded by several commentators. O'Connell 9- Effiand, supra note 31, at 242; Rheinstein, The Model Probate Code: A Critique,48 COLUM. L. REv. 534, 550 (1948).
105. UPC §2-503. The reason for the provision was to accommodate those who were
unable or did not desire legal advice. UPC §2-503, Comment; Curry, supra note 31, at 157.
Although the virtual necessity of legal counsel is one of the criticisms of the probate laws,
the wish to avoid the numerous legal contests arising in jurisdictions recognizing holographic
wills is perhaps sufficient reason for not according them special status. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Oldham, 203 Cal. 618, 265 P. 183 (1928); In re Estate of Major, 89 Cal. App. 238,
264 P. 542 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928): Paine v. Sanders, 135 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1961). It has been
observed that most of these problems deal with construction rather than authenticity and
therefore holographic wills should be recognized. Curry, supra note 31, at 157. This approach, however, fails to consider that many of the construction problems deal with whether
the writing was, in fact, intended as a will, that is, if there was a testamentary intent. If
this problem could be avoided, the provision recognizing holographic wills would have
much more to commend it.
106. Section 732.502(5) requires a codicil to be executed with the same formalities as a
will.
107. FPC §732.502 (1974).
108. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 101, at 5-6.
109. UPC art. 2, pt. 5, General Comment. The requirement for a signature at the
end of a will is to avoid "the subjective subtleties which . . .follow in the wake of Lemoyne
v. Stanley [83 Eng. Rep. 545 (1681) (holding that testator had signed his will when he
wrote 'I, John Stanley, make this my last will.')] and also to minimize the opportunity for
subsequent additions to the will." T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 303. This requirement has
given rise to much litigation and has invalidated a number of otherwise unquestionable
wills. Id. The litigation involves the meaning of "the end" of the will - that is, whether it
is the physical end or the logical end. Most courts hold that it is the logical end, but the
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justify retention of the requirement that the two attesting witnesses be "pres-

ent at the same time." This is not required by the laws of most other states, 110
is rejected by the UP,"'x and seems to put an undue premium upon legal
"know-how."' 2 Equally undesirable is the retention of the "purging" statute,'1 3 which voids gifts to attesting witnesses unless there are two other disinterested attesting witnesses to the will. The prototype of this statute was
enacted in 1752,"14 as an alternative to declaring the entire will invalid. At that
time interest absolutely disqualified a potential witness from testifying in
court. 1 5 This evidentiary rule was abrogated long ago in this state" 6 and
interest of a witness now bears only on his credibility, not his ability to
testify."17 The UPC recommends that this eighteenth century relic be abandoned."l8

In summary, each of the above provisions finds its principal justification in
tradition; each adds an unneeded requirement, which in combination substantially impairs the desirable objective that execution be kept simple. The
legislature should modernize the requirements of execution by repealing these
question is unnecessarily open to litigation. See, e.g., Estate of Chase, 51 Cal. App. 2d 353, 124
P.2d 895 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); In re Estate of Stinson, 228 Pa. 475, 77 A. 807 (1910). See
also T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 303; Curry, supra note 31, at 155. The UPC avoids this
problem by simply requiring that the wills be "signed by the testator or in the testator's
name by some other person in the testator's presence by his direction." UPC §2-502.
110. Only New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Florida require the witnesses to be present at
the same time; nine others (Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) require the witnesses to sign in the presence of
each other.
111. UPC art. 2, pt. 5, General Comment.
112. See text accompanying notes 130-134 infra.
113. Compare FP0 §732.502(3) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.07(5) (1973). The witness is
entitled, however, to so much of the gift as does not exceed the share of the estate that
would be distributed to him "if the will were not established." The quoted language of this
"saving" clause has been interpreted to apply only to a gift to the heir-witness. It is not
available to save the gift to a witness who was a beneficiary under a prior will that would
be effective if the later will were not established. In re Estate of Lubbe, 142 So. 2d 130 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1962). Such a restricted interpretation is unnecessarily destructive of the
testator's intent. In the somewhat analogous situation of a gift to charity being invalid if
made with 6 months of death, the legislature has seen fit to recognize a longstanding intent
of a testator evidenced by a prior will as sufficient to save the otherwise invalid gift in the
later will. See §732.803 of the 1974 Code discussed in notes 280-286 infra.
114. 25 Geo. II c. 6 (1752).
115.
116.

J. WIGNIOR, EVMENCE §576 (3d ed. 1940).
FLA. STAT. §90.05 (1973).

117. J. WIGMORIE, supra note 115, §§966, 1514.
118. The drafters of the UPC believe that a purging statute is unnecessary because "a
substantial gift by will to a person who is one of the witnesses to the execution of the will
would in itself be a suspicious circumstance, and the gift could be challenged on grounds of
undue influence." UPC §2-505, Comment. Furthermore, they argue that "the requirement
of disinterested witnesses has not succeeded in preventing fraud and undue influence; and
in most cases of undue influence, the influencer is careful not to sign as witness but to use
disinterested witnesses." Id: Thus,'the ititent is not "to foster use of interested- witnesses, and

attorneys will continue to use-disinterested witnesses in execution of wills. But the rare and
innocent use of a member of the testatorS family on a home drawn will would no longer
be penalized." Id.
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provisions and adopting in their place the appropriate provisions of the
UPC.119

Another situation where technicalities of execution may easily frustrate a
clearly expressed testamentary intent concerns a will executed outside the state
in accordance with the law of the place of execution. 12 0 The extent to which
such a will is recognized as valid in Florida if it does not meet Florida's requirements for execution is of particular importance because of the state's
rapid growth as a retirement mecca and winter retreat. The problem of retirees who become residents of Florida after having made their wills in their
former domiciles is somewhat different from that of the winter visitors who
maintain second homes in Florida. The retirees' concern is whether as new residents of the state their old wills are valid to dispose of all property wherever
located so that their over-all estate plans will be effectuated. The winter visitors' concern is whether as nonresidents their wills are valid to dispose of their
property located in Florida. Under current law a retiree's will is invalid for
all purposes after a change of residence, whereas the will of a winter visitor is
effective to devise personal property in the state but ineffective as to real
property 121 as long as the present residence is retained. 1 22 The 1974 Code
remedies the above discrimination against Florida residents and also validates
the will of the nonresident as it applies to realty.123 The discrimination is
compounded, however, in the case of an emergency will. Assume that while
119. If subsection (3) of §732.502 is repealed, subsection (2) of §732.504 should also be
changed to eliminate the opening phrase "[s]ubject to the provisions of §732.502(3), F.S."
At first glance it is somewhat anomalous that this subsection was included in the 1974 Code
after it was decided to retain the "purging" statute. The reason for its inclusion in the UPC
is clear. Because the "purging" statute was being eliminated, it was desirable to include an
affirmative statement that a will is not invalid because signed by an interested witness. However, even with the "purging" statute this subsection may operate to prevent litigation over
whether an indirect interest-such as the witness who is the spouse or parent of a legatee
-,which would not be purged, would invalidate the will.
120. If the testator seeks legal advice in making his will, execution probably will be in
accordance with the law of the place where it is executed.
121. FLA. STAT. §731.07(3) provides: "No will executed by a nonresident of Florida, either
before or after this law takes effect, is valid as a will in this state unless it is executed in
accordance with the laws of this state in force at the time of its execution, except that a
will valid under the laws of the state or country in which the testator is domiciled at the
time of his death is valid in this state, so far as it relates to personal property,"
122. If the nonresident moves his residence to a state other than Florida the continued
validity of his will in Florida would depend upon whether it was executed in accordance
with the laws of his new residence because the statutory exceptions apply only to (1) wills
of nonresidents and (2) wills valid under the laws of the state of domicile at death. In a
highly mobile society, tying validity to the laws of the domicile at death seems likely to
frustrate the intent of many testators and therefore is undesirable.
123. Section 732.502(2) reads: "Any will, other than a holographic or noncupative will,
executed by a nonresident of Florida, either before or after this law takes effect, is valid as
a will in this state if valid under the laws of the state or country where the testator resided
at the time of execution."
Conceivably the statute could be construed to apply only to wills of persons who died as
nonresidents of Florida and not to wills executed prior to becoming a resident of the state.
If so, the discrimination against retirees who become residents of the state continues in aggravated form.
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traveling outside the state of his residence, a retiree or winter resident executes a new will in accordance with the laws of the place of execution. If
the retiree's will is not executed according to the 1974 Code, it is ineffective
for all purposes. In the case of the winter visitor, however, the will is valid in
Florida for both real and personal property if it is executed in accordance
with the law of the state of his residence. This discrimination could be
remedied by adopting the suggested UPC provision 124 or by changing subsection (2) of section 732.502 of the 1974 Code to read: "Any will, other than
a holographic or nuncupative will, executed before or after this law takes effect, is valid as a will in this state if valid under the laws of the state or
12 5
country where it was executed."'

A final problem with the new execution requirements is exposed by an
examination of the otherwise desirable section on self-proved wills - section
732.503. First introduced in Florida in 1973,126 the section was taken verbatim
from the UPC127 and was designed to provide a method of admitting a will
to probate without testimony of any subscribing witness if a specified affidavit
had been executed by the testator and the witnesses . 2 Although the form of
the affidavit has been modified by the 1974 Code, a potential problem remains
that could affect the validity of any will, not just those purporting to be selfproved. The form of affidavit specified by the current section contains three
declarations that are not expressly required for a valid execution by section
732.502: (1) that witnesses signed "in the presence" of the testator; (2) at his
request; and (3) an opinion of the witnesses about the testator's capacity to
make a will. 29 The 1974 Code omits the latter two but retains a statement in
the affidavit that "each of the witnesses in the presence of the testator, and in

the presence of each other signed the will as a witness."13 0 The requirement

124. UPC §2-506 provides that a written will is valid if executed in compliance with
local law (such as §732.502(1) of the 1974 Code): "[O]r if its execution complies with the
law at the time of execution of the place where the will is executed, or of the law of the
place where at the time of execution or at the time of death the testator is domiciled, has
a place of abode or is a national."
This would validate holographic wills of Florida residents as well as nonresidents if the
will were executed in a state that recognized holographic wills.
125. The usual situation where the broader language of the UPC might be needed to
validate a will would be where the execution did not comply with either Florida law or
the law of the place of execution because the testator, presumably without legal advice,
elected to follow the more familiar law of his own country, residence, or abode. This possibility becomes of less importance if holographic wills are not to be recognized even in the
case of nonresidents of the state.
126. Fla. Laws ch. 73-8, §1, enacting FLA. STAT. §731.071 (1973).
127. UPC §2-504.
128. Aside from this, however, a self-proved will is no different from any other will and
"may be contested (except in regard to signature requirements), revoked, or amended by a
codicil in exactly the same fashion as a will not self-proved." UPC §2-504, Comment. The
affidavit may be executed at the same time as the will, or at any subsequent date, and
notarized and attached to or following the will in substantially the form prescribed by
statute. FLA. STAT. §731.071 (1973).
129. Id.; UPC §2-504.

130. FPC §732.503 (1974).
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that the witnesses sign in the presence of the testator stems from the original
Statute of Frauds and is found in most of the wills acts in this country.131
The meaning of "presence" has caused considerable litigation concerning
whether the testator must be able to see the witnesses sign (the "sight test")
or merely be aware of their signing through his other senses (the "conscious
presence" rule). 132 The existence of the requirement is regularly deplored' 33
and at least one court has held that the requirement does not exist in Florida." 4 It would be most unfortunate for the requirement to be imputed to
the provisions of section 732.502(1) because of the form of affidavit of the selfproved will. 13 5 To avoid this possibility the legislature should delete from the

affidavit the phrase "in the presence of the testator, and .... "
Relaxation of the Requirements of FormalExecution
The increasing use of complex trust arrangements makes it both convenient
and advisable to refer to an existing instrument in a will, rather than to reproduce its contents entirely.136 Case law in a majority of states, including
Florida, 13 allows the contents of the document to be incorporated into the
will by reference."3 8 This doctrine was codified by the UPC,"1 and has been

adopted by the 1974 Code. The new section simply requires that the writing
be described sufficiently and be in existence at the time of execution, and that
the intent to incorporate it be manifest in the language of the will.140

131.

See Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 613, 614-25 (1960).

132. 74 A.L.R.2d 318 (1960).
133. T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 340; 2 W. BOWE & D.
WILLS §19.127

PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF

(1960); Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 101, at 10-11. All of these authorities

have stated that very little fraud is prevented by compliance with this particular provision.
Atkinson further states: "It is sometimes assumed that the requirement is for the satisfaction
of the testator himself. If so, it is rather strange that the will should be held invalid for
disregard of this provision, especially if the testator has permitted the witnesses to sign
outside of his presence. A more plausible reason for the provision is that it promotes
compactness and solemnity of the execution ceremony. On the whole, there is not sufficient

basis in policy for a strict construction of the provision." T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at
340-41.
134. In re Leo's Will, 12 Fla. Supp. 61 (Cir. Ct. Dade County 1958). Cf. In re Estate of
Watson, 226 So. 2d 249 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
135. Concerning the effect on a self-proved will of the failure of the witnesses to sign in
the presence of the testator, alternative results could be reached: (1) the will is invalid because this requirement is implied into the provisions of §732.502(l); (2) the will is valid, but
cannot be self-proved; or (3) the will is valid and may be self-proved because thie affidavit
need only be substantially in the form suggested. FPC §732.503 (1974). The third alternative
seems most desirable.
136. Thus, a testator may wish to dispose of certain property according to the provisions of an existing trust, or utilize a lengthy provision of another document in his will,
rather than repeat the provision. It is more convenient to simply refer to the other writing
and thereby incorporate it into his will, thus avoiding any chance of error.

137. Forsythe v. Spielberger, 86 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1956).
138.

T.

ATKINSON,

supra note 12, at 385.

139. UPC §2-510.
140. FPC §732.512 (1974).
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Another device popular among estate planners is the use of the "pour-over"
provision in the will. 14 1 In many instances, the devise to the trust may be accomplished under the doctrine of incorporation by reference or by reference
to acts of independent significance. If the trust is amendable or revocable, however, or if it contains only minimal assets, the devise could be invalidated for
failure to comply with the formalities of execution. 142 Florida has avoided
this problem to a large degree by statutory language allowing wide latitude in
the types of trusts to which a valid devise may be made. 43 This provision is
44
continued in the 1974 Code with only editorial changes.
In light of this provision and the adoption of the section on incorporation
by reference, it is interesting to note that section 2-512, a similar UPG provision dealing with events of independent significance, was not also adopted.
Perhaps this was inadvertent, or it may have been thought that section 2-512
was not needed because the 1974 Code continues the above section concerning
devises to trustees. 45 The doctrine of independent significance, however, is
141. This is simply a provision directing that certain probate assets, usually the
residuary, be added td an existing trust. For many of the same reasons that underlie the
doctrine of incorporation by reference, the terms of the trust are not reproduced in the will.
See note 136 supra.
142. Thus, if the trust has been amended after the execution of the will, the amendment may invalidate the pour-over provision. Even if it does not, the question remains
whether the amendment will be given effect or whether the terms existing at execution will
be enforced. Finally, if the testator relies upon acts of independent significance, there is
doubt whether the doctrine may be utilized with a trust containing only minimal assets,
such as an unfunded insurance trust. See O'Connell & Effland, supra note 31, at 244-45;
Curry, supra note 31, at 166-67. For a discussion of the Florida problems arising in this
area, see Emanuel, Revocable Trusts-Do They Solve or Create Problems?, 46 FLA. BJ. 78
(1972); Hart, Inter vivos Trusts: Unanticipated Connotations, 46 FLA. B.J. 16 (1972); Roth,
Rebirth of Revocable Trust in Florida,44 FLA. B.J. 82 (1970).
143. FLA. STAT. §736.17 (1973). Both this section and its companion, §689.075, mingle
the doctrines of incorporation by reference and acts of independent significance.
144. FPC §732.513 (1974). The section provides that a valid devise may be made to an

existing trust or one executed concurrently with the execution of the will if the trust is
identified in the will. The devise is not invalidated for any or all of the following reasons:
"(a) Because the trust is amendable or revocable, or both, by any person; or (b) Because
the trust has been amended or revoked in part after execution of the will or codicil to it;
or (c) Because the trust instrument or any amendment to it is not executed in the manner
required for wills; or (d) Because the possible expectancy of receiving benefits as a named
beneficiary of a life insurance policy deposited, or to be deposited, which is the trustee's
only trust res, and even though the testator or some other person has reserved any or all
rights of ownership in the insurance contracts, including the right to change the beneficiary;
or (e) Because of any of the provisions of §689.075 F.S." Id.
FP0 §732.513 also states: "(3) Mhe devise shall disclose the property under the terms of
the instrument that created the trust, as theretofore or thereafter amended; (4) The entire
revocation of a trust by an instrument in writing before the testator's death shall invalidate
the devise of the bequest; (5) Unless the will provides otherwise, the property devised shall
not be held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but shall become a part of the
principal of the trust to which it is devised; (6) This section shall be cumulative to all
laws touching upon the subject matter." Id.
Although different in format, there is 1no
significant difference between this provision and
that suggested by UPC §2-511.
145. See notes 143-144 supra and accompanying text.
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broader than devises to trustees. 146 While existing case law may well cover
such situations, 14 7 the adoption of a specific statutory authorization could
easily prevent future unnecessary litigation,148 a policy underlying many of
49
the new provisions.
The failure to adopt U13C section 2-512 is even more questionable in light
of a new provision, adopted from the UPC, that relaxes strict adherence to
the incorporation by reference doctrine. The section allows a will to dispose
of items of tangible personal property not otherwise the subject of specific
devise, by simply referring to a written statement that may be prepared before
or after the execution of the will.150 While certain types of property are excluded,"' the relaxation of the usual formal requirements is made more
evident by the fact that the writing may be altered by the testator after its
preparation and that it need not have any independent significance.'52 This
seems a desirable addition to Florida law for the usual gifts of mementos to
friends. It could be abused, however, in the case of valuable paintings or
jewelry. In disposing of such objects it would seem desirable to retain the pro53
tections of the formalities of execution of a will."

Revocation
General. The primary methods by which a will may be revoked have undergone only editorial modifications. Thus, in spite of several format changes,
the 1974 Code continues to provide three methods of revocation: (1) by a
subsequent writing that expressly or impliedly revokes the will or any part of

146. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 394-98.
147. See Howe v. Fry, 116 Fla. 528, 157 So. 331 (1934) (sustaining devise to "servants in
my employ at the time of my death"). Although there appear to be no Florida cases on
point, devises of "the automobile owned by me at my death" or "to the woman whom I may
marry" have been sustained in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Reinheimer's Estate, 265 Pa. 185,
108 A. 412 (1919); Metcalf v. Sweeny, 17 R.I. 213, 21 A. 364 (1891); Brook v. Kent, 13 Eng.
Rep. 136 (1840).
148. The failure to adopt what is essentially a companion provision to incorporation by
reference could be argued to be a legislative rejection of the doctrine of acts of independent
significance, except as applied to trusts.
149. See text accompanying notes 191-210, 323-337 infra, concerning the new provisions
designed to specify when ademption or satisfaction occur, thus removing much of the
necessity of inquiry concerning the testator's intent.
150. FPC §732.515 (1974).
151. Money, evidence of indebtedness, documents of title, securities, and property used
in a trade or business are specifically excepted. Id.
152. The section requires the writing to be signed by the testator, while the UPC provides the alternative of allowing it to be in the testator's handwriting even though not
signed. Compare FPC §732.515 (1974), with UPC §2-513.
153. This could best be accomplished by including a dollar limitation in the provision.
For example, the new statute could be amended to read: "items of tangible personal property no one of which has the value of more than _
dollars."
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it;1 (2) by a physical act intended to revoke the entire will; 155 or (3) by
dissolution of marriage causing partial revocation. 56 Although the Florida
version of the first method is more specifically worded, it has the same effect as
the corresponding UPC provision. 57 Failure to follow the UPC in the latter
two instances, however, leaves several traps for unwary testators that the UPC
has avoided.
PartialRevocation by Act. Contrary to the recommendation of the UPC15
and despite the evident belief of laymen and even some attorneys that such a
revocation is effective, 59 the 1974 Code continues to prohibit a partial revocation by act. 60 Perhaps the prohibition was continued because of a fear of the
possible litigation that could be engendered. But even when there has been an
attempted act of total revocation, courts must often determine whether the
act was sufficient and if it was done with the requisite intent.'6 ' Thus, it is
doubtful that the burden of the courts would be measurably increased by
recognizing the expectations of the average testator and permitting partial

revocations by act.

62

154. FPC §732.505 (1974). This combines current §§731.12-.13 of the Florida Statutes
and provides that revocation may be implied by a subsequent inconsistent will or be expressly stated in a subsequent written will, codicil, or other writing declaring the revocation, if the same formalities required for the execution of wills are observed in the execution of the subsequent instrument. If implied, the revocation extends only as far as the
inconsistency exists. In any event, the revocation may be partial or total. Id.
155. FPC §732.506 (1974). Revocation in this manner may be accomplished by the
testator, or some person in his presence and at his direction, "burning, tearing, cancelling,
defacing, obliterating or destroying the will with the intent and for the purpose of revocation." Id.
156. Section 732.507 provides that all wills made by husband and wife, where the marriage has subsequently been dissolved, shall be void as the will affects the surviving divorced
spouse. See text accompanying notes 169-176 infra. Section 732.507 also provides that a subsequent marriage, birth, or adoption will not revoke a will but that the pretermitted child
or spouse will inherit as set forth in §§732.301, .302. See text accompanying notes 163-168
infra.
157. UPC §2-507(1) provides: "A will or any part thereof is revoked by a subsequent
will which revokes the prior will or part expressly or by inconsistency .... " The official
comment states that in the case of a subsequent inconsistent will, the court is left to the
"determination of whether a subsequent will which has no express revocation clause is inUPC §2-507,
consistent with the prior will so as to revoke it wholly or partially .....
Comment.
158. UPC §2-507 provides for revocation by writing or act and specifically applies to
both total or partial revocation.
159. The case of In re Estate of Shiffiet, 170 So. 2d 96 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964), is a recent
example of this misunderstanding. See note 160 infra.
160. Section 732.506 begins: "A will is revoked . . . [by act]," whereas §732.505 is prefaced with: "A will or any part of it is revoked . . . [by a subsequent writing]." See In re
Estate of Shiffiet, 170 So. 2d 96 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964) (providing that partial revocation
may only be accomplished by strict compliance with §731.13, the predecessor of FPC
§732.505).
161. E.g., Vaughn v. Vaughn, 217 Ala. 364, 116 So. 427 (1928); Porch v. Farmer, 158 Ga.
55, 122 S.E. 557 (1924); In re Burke's Will, 91 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
162.

T. ATaNSON, supra note 12, at 445.
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Pretermitted Spouse or Child. At common law a will was revoked by a
woman's subsequent marriage, or upon the birth of a child after a man's marriage.163 These rules were changed by the 1933 Probate Code6 and since that
time the will is not revoked 65 but the pretermitted spouse or child receives a
share of the estate equal to his or her intestate share, except in a few rare
instances. 166 With one addition, these provisions have been carried forward
into the 1974 Code with only editorial changes.' 6 7 Added in the case of the
pretermitted child is an eminently desirable clause from the UPC that makes
the section inapplicable if "the testator had one or more children when the
will was executed and devised substantially all his estate to the other parent of
the pretermitted child."'16 8
Revocation by Dissolution of Marriage.The 1974 Code also carries forward,
with only editorial changes, existing law that voids any part of the will affecting the surviving divorced spouse, without providing for the testator's possible
remarriage to the former spouse. 69 Indeed, there seems to have been an intentional rejection of the UPC provision that "[i]f provisions are revoked
solely by this section, they are revived by the testator's remarriage to the
former spouse. ' ' 170 The failure to include such language seems most unfortunate. By combining the effect of the current provision with that of the
pretermitted spouse, 1 the courts have reached results that seem clearly contrary to the expectations of testators who have divorced and later remarried
the same spouse.17 2 The current statute voiding will provisions for a divorced
163. Id. at 422.
164.

Compare Comp. Gen. Laws §§5461, 5463 (1927), with Fla. Laws 1933, ch. 16,103,

§15; see Easterlin v. Easterlin, 61!Fla. 468, 56 So. 688 (1911) (in absence of statute, it is the
law of Florida that a will is revoked in these situations).
165. FLA. STAT. §731.14(2) (1973).
166. FLA. STAT. §§731.10-.11 (1973). Exceptions are: if the testator expressed a contrary
intent in the will; if, in the case of the spouse, there was a provision by marriage contract, or
if the spouse was already provided for in the will. Id.
167. FIPC §732.301 (spouse), §732.302 (child) (1974). These sections differ considerably
from the more comprehensive sections in the UPC. See UPC §§2-301, -302.
168. FPC §732.302 (1974). See UPC §2-302(a)(2). Presumably the theory is that having
omitted the known child or children, the testator has shown an intent to omit all his
children whether born before or after the execution of the will. This result could also be
reached under the more general exception "unless it appears from the will that the omission was intentional," FPC §732.302 (1974), but it seems desirable to make this explicit. The
added language, however, will require interpretation of the phrase "substantially all his
estate." Id.
169. Compare FPC §732.507(2) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.101 (1973).
170. UPC §2-508.
171. See notes 165-166 supra and accompanying text.
172. In re Estate of Guess, 213 So. 2d 638 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); In re Estate of Bauer,
161 So. 2d 678 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1964). In Bauer the testator devised his homestead to his
widow and the balance of a considerable estate to paternal and maternal relatives. After
the will was executed, the marriage was dissolved, but the parties remarried a year later.
The widow successfully challenged the will on the grounds that she was a pretermitted
spouse because the marriage occurred after the will was made and therefore she was not
provided for in the will because the divorce had voided the devise. As a result, she took the
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spouse was adopted in 19513 71 to reflect the probable intention of a testator
whose marriage had been dissolved. There is normally no reason why, after a
remarriage to the former spouse, the testator would not equally intend a reinstatement of the provisions of the former will.1 74 Because there is almost al-

ways a drastic disruption of the testamentary plan by the application of the
pretermitted child or spouse statutes, their use can be justified only in terms
of protecting the spouse or child from inadvertent omission from the will.y75

If the clause that was revoked by divorce is revived, the spouse who has remarried the testator is provided for in the will and has the same protection

as any spouse who is dissatisfied with the testamentary provisions - the right
to elect to take one-third of the estate. 176 The UPC provision reviving such
voided provisions of the testator's will seems badly needed in a modem probate statute.
Revival and Republication. By continuing with only editorial changes the
existing statutory provisions on revival and republication, 7 7 the 1974 Code
entire estate, obviously contrary to the intent of the testator. In Guess, because the voided
devise was a part of the residuary estate, the court decreed a partial intestacy.
173. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26-914, §1, at 1063.
174. This was ignored by the Bauer court, perhaps due to their seeming distaste for
such conduct:
"We are convinced that the legislative intent behind F.S. §731.101, F.S.A., was not to
invest married persons with a spigot-like means to turn their testamentary attitudes off
and on at random by the device of executing a will, following it with divorce, following it
by remarriage, and so on ad infinitum. The legislative purpose was unquestionably directed
toward curing the incongruous situation resulting when, as is usually the case, the divorced
parties do not make successive excursions upon the sea of matrimony and the testator dies
leaving a will extant containing benefits to the divorced spouse. The legislature might well
have had in mind the fact that some deaths occur before the testator has had an opportunity following divorce to reframe or destroy the existing will or has simply neglected
to do so; that if he desires the divorced spouse to participate in his estate, the better rule is
to require a new will to be executed to that effect." 151 So. 2d 678, 680 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
While the prime purpose of the legislation was undoubtedly to prevent a divorced
spouse from taking under a prior will, it is unlikely that the legislature considered the possibility of "successive excursions upon the sea of matrimony." Moreover, the court's concern
for prohibiting "spigot-like means [by which the testators could] turn their testamentary
attitudes off and on at random" seems misplaced, for the common law has long allowed acts
of independent significance to affect the testamentary plan. See text accompanying notes
146-147 supra.
175. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 141.

176, FPC §§732.201-.204 (1974). See text accompanying notes 246-272 infra.
177. Thus, the revocation of a will that revokes a former will does not revive the
former will. FPC §732.508. The revocation of a will continues to revoke all codidis to the
will, FPC §732.509, and the execution of a codicil referring to a previous will republishes
the will as modified by the codicil. FPC §732.510. Additionally, a will that has been revoked, or is invalid for any other reason, may be republished by reexecution of the will itself or by the execution of a codicil referring to it. FPC §732.511. The last section does add
"or the execution of a codicil republishing it" to the existing statute, FLA. STAT. §731.18
(1973). This is no change, however, for §731.17 currently allows republication by codicil.
Additionally, if the will were invalid for reasons other than revocation, case law has held a
"codicil has the effect of republishing the will itself." Gair v. Lockhart, 45 So. 2d 193, 194
(Fla. 1950) (will originally invalidly executed). Possibly the omission in §732.508 of the
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rejects "a limited revival doctrine," 1 78 suggested by the UPC for situations
where it is evident that a testator revoking a later will intends to reinstate the
provisions of an earlier will.1"9 This rejection seems unfortunate from the
point of view of effectuating a testator's known intent, but may be justified
in terms of avoiding the expense and delay of litigation necessary to determine when "it is evident from the circumstances of the revocation of the
second will or from testator's contemporary or subsequent declarations that
he intended the first will to take effect as executed." 18°
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
Due primarily to either the draftsman's lack of recognition of likely problems, or a lack of foresight in dealing with them, a variety of will construction
problems regularly arise. Various solutions to these problems have been formulated by the courts and occasionally by the legislatures of different states. In
some instances substantial unanimity is found, while in other situations
diverse results are reached. Presumably to further uniformity throughout the
country and to minimize future litigation, the UPC recommends codified
solutions to several common problems. The 1974 Code accepts many of the
UPC recommendations concerning both content and phraseology.' 8' Nevertheless, the adoption of the UPC terminology, when coupled with the legislative failure to adopt one of its sections, could create for the unwary misapprehension about the application of those sections that were adopted.

word "expressly" contained in the current §731.14 may expand the application of the provision to prevent revival of a former will that was revoked by the inconsistency of a later
will. For example, a testator executes a will, later executing a second will that does not
expressly revoke the first, but does revoke it by inconsistency. Still later, the second will is
revoked. Under §731.14 the first will might be held to be revived because the second did
not "expressly" revoke it. Under §732.508, however, this apparently could not be the result.
178. UPC §2-509, Comment.
179. UPC §2-509 reads:
"(a) If a second will which, had it remained effective at death, would have revoked
the first will in whole or in part, is thereafter revoked by acts under Section 2-507, the first
will is revoked in whole or in part unless it is evident from the circumstances of the
revocation of the second will or from testator's contemporary or subsequent declarations
that he intended the first will to take effect as executed.
"(b) If a second will which, had it remained effective at death, would have revoked the
first will in whole or in part, is thereafter revoked by a third will, the first will is revoked
in whole or in part, except to the extent it appears from the terms of the third will that
the testator intended the first will to take effect."
180. UPC §2-509(a).
181. The legislature failed to adopt the first three of these UPC provisions. The first
was rejected because of a preference for the existing simultaneous death statute, instead of
the UPC requirement that an heir or devisee survive for a fixed period in order to share in
the estate. Compare FPC §732.601 (1974), with UPC §2-601. The omission of the second
provision, §2-602, which allows a testator to choose the state law to be used in determining
the meaning and legal effect of his will, is an evidence of the parochialism of the 1974 Code.
The reasons and effect of these rejections will be considered later. See text accompanying
notes 316-322 and
infra (part II). The third affects the remaining rules and is
therefore considered now.
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Section 2-603 of the UPC, which was not included in the 1974 Code, declares the supremacy of the testator's intent. 8 2 Thereafter, this qualification is
ignored in succeeding sections. By omitting the provision, several sections of
the 1974 Code could be misread as stating a rule that operates despite a
testamentary provision to the contrary. 83 Reference to the title of the Part
should negate this, but it would seem better for the legislature to avoid the
problem by adopting section 2-603.
Lapsed and Void Devises
If a beneficiary predeceases the testator, or for any other reason is unable
to receive his gift, there arises the problem of the proper disposition of the
property subject to the gift. If the testator has thought of the eventuality and
provided an alternative disposition, it, of course, will be given effect. In the
absence of such a testamentary provision, however, the proper disposition depends upon a variety of factors: the relationship of the testator and the donee,
whether the donee left lineal descendants, whether the gift is a residuary or
nonresiduary gift, and whether the gift is made to the donee as an individual
or as a member of a class. Currently, the relevant Florida statute provides that
unless a contrary intent appears in the will, a gift to a person who predeceases
the testator, or who is dead at the time the will is executed, lapses unless the
devisee or legatee is an adopted child or blood kindred of the testator who
died leaving lineal descendants who survive the testator184 This result is
somewhat altered by the 1974 Code's adoption of a modified provision of the
UPC requiring the devisee to be a lineal descendant of the testator's grandparent, rather than merely a blood kindred of the testator.5 5 As a result,
182. UPC §2-603 reads: "The intentions of a testator as expressed in his will controls
the legal effect of his dispositions. The rules of construction expressed in the succeeding
sections of this Part apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will."
183. This misreading seems to be the basis for suggestions already made to the Probate
Commission that §732.602 needs to be amended. The possibility of misapprehension is also
enhanced for those comparing the language of the new sections with comparable sections
of existing statutes, because existing sections expressly defer to a contrary intent in many
instances-for example, §731.05(2) (will passes after-acquired property "unless the testator
expressly states in his will that such is not his intention"), §731.20(2) (lapsed or void legacy
becomes part of residue "unless a contrary intent is expressed by the testator in his will").
184. FLA. STAT. §731.20 (1973). The anti-lapse portion provides that the "descendants
take the property ... in the same manner as the devisee or legatee would have done had
he survived the testator." Id. As noted earlier, many historical terminologies are eliminated
from the 1974 Code, often because of the disappearance of any distinction between real and
personal property in more modem provisions. See note 45 supra. Generally, these new
definitions are adopted by this article. Thus, the term "devise" "includes the words gift,
give, bequeath, bequest, or legacy," and therefore anyone who is designated in a will to receive a devise is simply termed a "devisee." FPC §§731.201(6), (7) (1974).
185. Compare FPC §732.603 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.20 (1973). The section is
adopted from UPC §2-605 with two substantive changes. First, the UPC requirement that
the issue of the deceased devisee survive the testator by 120 hours was dropped because of
the continuation of Florida's simultaneous death statute in lieu of the UPC provision requiring all devisees to survive the testator by 120 hours. UPC §2-601. See text accompanying notes 316-322 infra. Second, the section allows per stirpes distribution rather than the
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lapsed gifts will no longer be saved for remote kindred, thus conforming the
anti-lapse statute to the elimination of the "laughing heir" in the intestacy
provisions.186 Moreover the new statute expressly covers class gifts, even if the
devisee died prior to the execution of the will,' s7 and therefore seems to go
farther than existing case law that only extends the anti-lapse statute to class
members living at the time of will execution. 18
Although these provisions are a desirable modernization of Florida law,
there is an inconsistency with the intestacy provisions that should be corrected. As will be discussed, a new statute prevents the deduction of a debt
owed the decedent from the intestate share of any person except the debtor. 8 9
From a policy standpoint, there is no reason why the same protection should
not be extended to those taking under the anti-lapse statute. Section 732.603
should be amended to include language appropriate to modify the effect of
the right of retainer statute in this situation. 19°
Change in Property Holdings

The law pertaining to the effect of changes in the testator's property between the time of the execution of the will and the testator's death has undergone considerable modification and clarification. Presently no statute controls
in these situations and many of the fact variations have not been passed upon
by the Florida courts. The adoption of two UPC provisions by the 1974 Code
should considerably reduce the litigation necessary to determine the Florida
law in these situations.
UPC's per capital with representation. This too conforms to other provisions of the 1974
Code that differ from the UPC. See text accompanying note 42 supra, note 221 infra.
Because of a format change that follows the UPC, the general lapse provision is now
contained in a separate section, FPC §732.604. This section also incorporates prevailing case
law that if there are two or more residuary legatees and one's share fails for any reason,
that share passes to the other residuary legatees in proportion to their interests in the
residue. FPC §732.604(a) (1974). This conforms with the result reached in In re Clark, 212
So. 2d 72 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968) and Magruder v. Magruder, 157 So. 2d 86 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1963).
186. See text accompanying notes 59-65 supra. Adopted children may have also been
removed from the statute's coverage. See text accompanying notes 73-86 supra.
187. FPC §732.603 (1974).
188. Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So. 2d 473 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959). The testatrix had seven
brothers and sisters, five of whom predeceased her leaving lineal descendants. Three of
these had died prior to her execution of a wvill leaving the residuary of her estate to "my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike." Id. The court applied §731.20 to the class
members alive at execution, reasoning that the statute's use of the plural "blood kindred"
manifested an intent to include class gifts in its coverage. Seemingly influenced by their
interpretation of the testatrix's intent, however, the court "strictly construed" the statute to
preclude application to the three brothers who had died prior to execution, because it dealt
only with lapsed, rather than void, gifts.
189. FPC §732.109 (1974). The section simply provides the estate with statutory authorization for offsetting the amount of any noncontingent indebtedness of a distributee against
infra (part II).
the distributee's interest. See text accompanying notes
190. The suggested amendment might be made by adding a sentence to the end of FPC
§732.603 reading: "A debt owed to the testator by the deceased devisee shall not be charged
against the lineal descendants of the deceased devisee taking under this section."
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Accessions. Because of frequent changes in a testator's holdings of corporate securities due to mergers and consolidations, as well as the increasing
use of stock splits and dividends, 9 ' courts regularly have been called upon to
decide whether a specific legacy of corporate securities has either been
adeemed, or alternatively, covers additional or substituted securities. The test
generally followed in both situations is whether there has been a change in
substance or merely a change in form.192 While Florida follows this formsubstance dichotomy, 93 there is an inherent weakness in the test. Every new
variation in corporate financing creates the potential necessity for a judicial
determination of whether the change in holdings is merely one of form, or
results in an ademption because it is a change in substance. Adopted with one
substantial difference from the UPC, a new section of the 1974 Code attempts
to resolve this problem by detailing the particular changes in security holdings
that will be covered by a specific devise. 194 The section attempts to obtain desirable flexibility to cope with future corporate innovations by including in
this category essentially any change that is initiated by the entity; 95 all others
are intended to be excluded. 90 Unfortunately, however, both the UPC and
the Florida version unwittingly failed to provide for a frequent occurrence in
the area - dividends whose declaration and record dates are prior to the
testator's death, but that are payable thereafter.'9g The section, therefore,
191. See Curry, supra note 31, at 177; O'Connell & Efiland, supra note 31, at 253.
192. See, e.g., In re Frahm's Estate, 120 Iowa 85, 94 N.W. 444 (1903); Bool v. Bool, 165
Ohio St. 262, 135 N.E.2d 372 (1956). See generally Note, Ademption by Extinction: The
Form and Substance Test, 39 VA. L. Rav. 1085 (1953).
193. In re Estate of Watkins, 284 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1973) (no ademption resulting from

merger and resulting conversion of described stock, absent testator's change of intent); In re
Vail's Estate, 67 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1953) (stock split is change in form).
194. FPC §732.605 (1974). These are: "(a) As much of the devised securities as is a part
of the estate at the time of the testator's death; (b) Any additional or other securities of
the same entity owned by the testator because of action initiated by the entity excluding any
acquired by exercise of purchase options; (c) Securities of another entity owned by the
testator as a result of a merger, consolidation, reorganization or other similar action
initiated by the entity ..... Id. See UPC §2-607.
The 1974 Code eliminates, however, subdivision (4) of the UPC that allowed a specific
devisee to receive any additional securities owned by the testator as a result of a plan of
reinvestment in a regulated investment company. Perhaps this was omitted because it was
thought it would be too difficult to prove that the additional securities were the result of
such a reinvestment plan.
195. See note 194 supra.
196. The statute provides that the specific devisee "is entited only to" the accessions
enumerated in note 194 supra. FPC §732.605(1) (1974). In addition, subsection (2) provides

that "[d]istributions before death of a specifically devised security not provided for in subsection (1) above are not part of the specific devise." FPC §732.605(2) (1974). See notes 197198 infra.
197. While not readily apparent, the purpose of UPC §2-607 is to exclude cash dividends

from the specific legacy in this situation, while including stock dividends or stock splits.
Cash dividends are not provided for in subsection (a) and are therefore intended to be
covered by subsection (b), which provides: "Distributions prior to death with respect to a
specifically devised security not provided for in subsection (a) are not part of the specific

devise." UPC §2-607(b) (emphasis added).
The Official Comment states that this language is: "[Irntended to -codify existing law, to
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should be amended to accomplish more fully its intent of reducing litigation
in this area. 55
Ademption. When property other than corporate securities is involved, the
form-substance dichotomy has not been followed. r99 Instead, the general rule
is that a specific devise of property that is not owned by the testator at his
death is adeemed by extinction.200 In most states, if the ademption is by ex-

the effect that cash dividends declared and payable as of a record date occurring before the
testator's death do not pass as a part of the specific devise even though paid after death."
UPC §2-607, Comment (emphasis added).
It is difficult to see, however, how dividends "paid after death" can fit the statutory
language of "distributions prior to death." As far as cash dividends are concerned, therefore, the section would appear to be expressly limited to those actually paid prior to death.
The failure to exclude those dividends paid after death is not undesirable. If, as the
Comment seems to imply, stock dividends or stock splits paid after death on a record date
prior to death are to be considered part of the specific legacy, there is no good reason why
cash dividends should not be accorded equal treatment. But it may be that even stock
dividends will not be included in this situation, for the applicable provision refers only to
"any additional or other securities of the same entity owned by the testator." UPC
§2-607(a)(2) (emphasis added). While the testator would be entitled to them as of the
record date, he would not actually own them until they were paid. Therefore, if the
section were literally interpreted, neither stock dividends nor stock splits actually paid after
his death would be covered at all.
The 1974 Code apparently attempted to avoid at least part of this problem by making
the second subsection applicable only to distributions "of," rather than "with respect to" a
specifically devised security. Compare FPC §732.605(2) (1974), with UPC §2-607(b). While
this avoids application to dividends of any type and therefore the problem discussed above,
it severely limits the scope of the section. Only distributions of the specifically devised
security that were not initiated by the entity will be excluded from the specific devise. In
order to broaden the scope of the section, the language of the UPC - "with respect to a
specifically devised security" - should be reinstated. In this manner, litigation concerning
any distributions prior to death that are not covered by subsection (1) will be avoided.
At the same time, however, the problems of the UPC provision should be cured by the
addition of a fourth paragraph to subsection (1) that specifically covers the situation of a
dividend or stock split that was declared and payable before the testator's death, but which
was not actually paid until after death. A suggested provision is:
(1) . . . the specific devisee is entitled only to ....
(d) Distributions of cash or of securities described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) above
that are received after the testator's death; and ....
Such a provision would accord equal treatment to cash and stock dividends in the situation
described, as well as continue existing law that cash dividends that are declared and payable
after death are part of the specific devise. While it would expand §737.605 of the new
Principal and Income Provisions by including distributions of securities in the specific
devise (which are considered principal under §737.606(l) and therefore not payable under
§737.605(2)(a)), this would conform to the general intent of §732.605. Certainly it would
eliminate a likely source of litigation.
198. See note 197 supra for suggested amendments.
199. O'Connell & Eftland, supra note 31, at 254; Paulus, Ademption by Extinction: Siniting Lord Thurlow's Ghost, 2 TExAs TECH. L. REXV.195, 201 (1971).
200. T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 742.
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tinction, the intention of the testator is not considered relevant. 20 1 In Florida,
however, this intent is quite relevant. 20 2 Perhaps to reduce the testator's (and
legatee's) frustration caused by improper drafting, section 732.606 of the 1974
Code allows nonademption in certain cases where it is believed the testator
would probably so intend.20 3 Generally, these involve instances where an asset
is involuntarily removed from the estate shortly before death, or where the
testator has sold property and retained contract rights against the buyer. Although the section is somewhat misleading in its arrangement, 204 a specific
devisee will be entitled to any property remaining in the specific devise, as
well as any outstanding: (1) balance or security interest resulting from the sale
of the property by the testator; (2) amount of a condemnation award unpaid
at death; and (3) proceeds unpaid at death from fire or casualty insurance if
the subject property has been lost or destroyed. 2 5 The devisee is also entitled
to any "[p]roperty owned by the testator at his death as a result of foreclosure,
or obtained in lieu of foreclosure, of the security for the specifically devised
obligation.."20 6 Finally, in order to protect the devisee in cases where the property had been held by a guardian and the testator was unable to change his
will because of incompetency, the section allows the devisee to take a general
pecuniary devise equal to the amount realized by a sale, condemnation, or
insured casualty. 20 7 This seems to be merely a codification of Florida's existing
case law in the case of insurance proceeds 208 and guardianship sales, 20 9 but

201. Id. See, e.g., Lang v. Vaughn, 137 Ga. 671, 74 S.E. 270 (1912); Elwyn v. De
Garmendia, 148 Md. 109, 128 A. 913 (1925); Welch v. Welch, 147 Miss. 728, 113 So. 197
(1927); Hill's Adm'rs v. Hill, 127 Va. 341, 103 S.E. 605 (1920).
202. Eisenchenk v. Fowler, 82 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955); see In re Estate of Sacks, 267 So.
2d 888 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Balzebre v. First Nat'l Bank, 222 So. 2d 49 (Sd D.C.A. Fla.
1969); Forbes v. Burket, 181 So. 2d 682 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
203. O'Connell & Effland, supra note 31, at 254-55, suggests that a reason for this provision may be the desire to reduce the judicial search for intent.
204. FPC §732.606 (1974). A casual reading of the subdivisions might lead one to
think that subsection (2) applies only to specifically devised property held by a guardian of
the property of the testator. A more careful reading shows this is not the case and that
subsection (2) applies to a specific devisee of all testators. By reversing the subsections this
misapprehension could easily be avoided.
205. FPC §732.606(2) (1974).
206. Id.
207. FPC §732.606(l) (1974). The provision is not applicable if "subsequent to the sale,
condemnation or casualty, it is adjudicated that the disability of the testator has ceased
and the testator survives the adjudication by one (1) year." Id. Moreover, this right is reduced by any right the specific devisee has under subsection (2). These are enumerated in
the text accompanying notes 203-206 supra.
208. Cf. In re Estate of Sacks, 267 So. 2d 888 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972) (devisee entitled to
insurance proceeds; the will had also devised all policies of insurance in the specifically
devised property). Other jurisdictions have reached conflicting results in the Sacks situation.
Compare In re Estate of McDonald, 133 Cal. App. 2d 43, 283 P.2d 271 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
(devisee entitled to insurance proceeds, although policies were not included in the devise),
with In re Barry's Estate, 208 Okla. 8, 252 P.2d 437 (1952) (specific legatee entitled only
to automobile in its damaged state).
209. Forbes v. Burket, 181 So. 2d 682 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966) (specific devisee entitled to
an amount equal to the proceeds of the sale by guardian).
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giving the devisee the unpaid balance or security interest resulting from the
sale of property by the testator is a complete change in Florida law.2 10 The
effects of condemnation or foreclosures of the property specifically devised
have not been considered in Florida and consequently their coverage by the
statute resolves some uncertainty.
Other Rules of Construction
Several other rules of construction may be briefly mentioned.2 11 One that
encompasses two rules simply provides that "[a] will is construed to pass all
property that the testator owns at his death including property acquired after
the execution of the will."'21 2 By using this language, the section adopts a

presumption against partial intestacy and allows a will to pass after-acquired
property, absent a contrary intent.13 Another section codifies current case law
by requiring a specific reference or other indication of intent in a will before
a power of appointment is considered exercised in a general residuary clause.214
It has been suggested that because the testator is unlikely to view the property
subject to the power as his, this requirement probably reflects the typical belief that a general will clause does not exercise a power of appointment. -"'
Whether this is true or not, the provision seems desirable because powers of
appointment are regularly used in marital deduction clauses where the donor
of the power does not wish the power to be inadvertently exercised.
Another UPC provision intended to simplify the interpretation of wills
containing class gift terminology has been modified by the 1974 Code. The
UPC allows half-bloods, adopted persons, and persons born out of wedlock to
be included in a class gift in accordance with the intestacy rules for determining relationships.21 6 The Florida Code omits half-bloods from the section,217
possibly because the problem is unlikely to arise in class gifts, or because if it
does arise, giving the half-blood only one-half of the share of the whole

210. Eisenschenk v. Fowler, 82 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955) (mortgaged sale of specifically
devised property to devisees resulted in a total ademption).
211. Two sections that are also included in part VI of chapter 732 are considered later.
Section 732.601, governing simultaneous death, is equally applicable to intestacy and is
therefore discussed in the text accompanying notes 316-322 infra. Discussion of the section
on ademption by satisfaction (FPC §732.609) is postponed to allow comparison with the
corresponding intestacy provision on advancements. See text accompanying notes 323-337

infra.
212. FPC §732.602 (1974); see UPC §2-604. A similar provision concerning afteracquired property is currently found in FLA. STAT. §731.05(2) (1973), although it applies only
to wills containing a residuary clause.
213. That this is merely a rule of construction and subject to change by the testator is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 181-183 supra.
214. FPC §732.607 (1974). This provision continues the result reached in DePass v.
Kansas Masonic Home, 132 Fla. 455, 181 So. 410 (1938).
215. O'Connell 9:Effland, supra note 31, at 256.
216. UPC §2-611.
217. FPC §732.608 (1974). The section also omits the final clause of the UPC to conform
to the changes made in §732.108, governing inheritance by illegitimates.
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blood2'8 would be unlikely to reflect the intent of the maker of the class gift.
Assuming that the problems surrounding the intestacy provisions for adopted
children and illegitimates are resolved,2 - the section should greatly reduce the
220
possibility of litigation in the area.
A final rule states that "[u]nless the will provides otherwise, all devises
shall pass per stirpes." 221 The provision is not found in the UPC and is new
to Florida law. It seems to be designed to promote the Florida policy of per
stirpes distribution 222 by applying it to testamentary dispositions that are unclear on the matter.
LIMITATIONS ON TESTATION AND SUCCESSION

Most states impose some restrictions on the freedom of testation and on
intestate succession in order to protect the surviving spouse and minor children, or, in extreme cases, to bar unworthy heirs.?23 The protective restrictions
take the form of rights to homestead, certain exempt property and a family allowance, a right to avoid certain charitable gifts, and, in the case of the surviving spouse, the right to elect to take a share of the estate variously referred to
as "dower," "curtesy," "the statutory share," or "the elective share." Further
restrictions on the freedom of testation may result from contracts made during
the decedent's lifetime, and more recently, a statutory rejection of the effectiveness of in terrorem clauses. All of these restrictions appear in the 1974 Code,
but are scattered through various parts of chapter 732.
Homestead, Exempt Property,and Family Allowance
With one exception, the 1974 Code follows the UPC's enunciation of "certain rights and values to which a surviving spouse and certain children of a
deceased domiciliary are entitled in preference over unsecured creditors of the

estate and persons to whom the estate may be devised by will." 2 24 Three distinct concepts are used to provide this protection: (1) homestead; (2) exempt
property; and (3) a family allowance. Because of a constitutional mandate, 22r
the Code rejects a UPC recommendation for a set dollar amount for the
homestead allowance.2 26 Instead, an existing statute is continued that provides:
218. The section provides that the enumerated persons are included in a class gift "in
accordance with rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate succession."
The intestacy provision provides "the half-blood shall inherit only half as much as those of
the whole blood .... " FPC §732.105 (1974). By avoiding this result, the section continues
the common law rule in Florida. Lowrimore v. First Say. & Trust Co., 102 Fla. 740, 140 So.
887 (1931) (division among next of kin included nephews and nieces of the whole- and
half-blood).
219. FP0 §732.108 (1974). See text accompanying notes 73-87 supra.
220. O'Connell &Effland, supra note 31, at 257.
221. FPc §732.610 (1974).
222. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
223. T. ATmNSON, supra note 12, at 100.
224. UPC art. 2, pt. 4, General Comment (emphasis in original).
225. 1 LA. CONST. art. X, §4.
226. UPC §2-401. This was proposed in order to increase the use of the summary administration procedures of the UPC, UPC §2-401, Comment.
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The homestead shall descend as other property but if the decedent is
survived by a spouse and lineal descendants, the surviving spouse shall
take a life estate in the homestead, with a vested remainder 22to7 the lineal
descendants in being at the time of death of the decedent.
Because the class of lineal descendants is substantially different from the narrower constitutional class of minor children, the statute may well be ruled an
invalid extension of the Florida constitution. This was the result in the recent
225
decision of In re Estate of McGinty, which involved the similar statute con22 9
That provision has been changed by the 1974
cerning devise of homestead.
23 0
Code to conform to the McGinty decision. A similar modification should be
made in this provision to change the class to surviving spouse and minor
children.
In addition to homestead, the surviving spouse of a deceased domiciliary is
also entitled to certain exempt property over and above any benefit passing
under the will (unless it otherwise provides), or by intestate succession or
elective share. 231 A modification of the UPC, the provision allows the surviving spouse, or if there is no spouse, the minor children sharing jointly, to receive $5,000 of household furnishings and appliances, subject to any perfected
2 2
security interest, and $1,000 of personal effects. 3 The right to personal effects
may be negated by a specific devise in a will, but otherwise the rights have
2- 3
priority over all claims against the estate. 3 In combination, these will gen-

227. FPC §732.401 (1974) (emphasis added). See FLA. STAT. §731.27 (1973).
228. 258 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1972) (devise of residence to one of four daughters held valid).
This was confirmed in In re Estate of McCartney, 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974) (devise of
residence to spouse held valid when only adult children survived).
229.

FLA. STAT. §731.051(1) (1973).

230. FPC §732.516 (1974) restricts devise of the homestead if the decedent is survived by
a spouse or minor children. The current statute's purported restriction on devises of
homestead if a decedent was survived by a spouse or lineal descendent was invalidated in
two recent supreme court decisions. See note 228 and accompanying text supra.
231. FPC §732.402 (1974). There is a problem of clarity with respect to the provision
"unless . . . [the will] otherwise provides," for it is uncertain if a residuary gift will satisfy
this limitation, at least with respect to the $5,000 allowance. The $1,000 of personal property
may be avoided only by a specific devise in the will, but there is no similar language concerning the $5,000 worth of household furniture, furnishings, and appliances.
232. Id. See UPC §2-402. The UPC lumps household furnishings, et cetera, with personal
effects into a single dollar value, then provides: "If there is no surviving spouse, children of
the decedent are entitled jointly to the same value." This sentence is included in the 1974
Code with the limitation that only minor children are entitled to share. Because it provides
separate values for household furnishings and for personal effects, "value" should be changed
to "values" to avoid any contention that minor children are entitled only to the personal
effects.
The elimination of "automobile" from exempt property may prove inconvenient to the
survivors and detrimental in small estates where the value of household furnishings, et cetera,
may be considerably less than $5,000.
233. Id. There is no similar limitation on household furnishings and appliances. It
would seem to have the result that a testator may not dispose of the first $5,000 of these
goods if survived by a spouse and minor children. The last sentence of the section, however,
may allow him to force the surviving spouse and children to elect between the furnishings
he wishes to give others and the other provisions in the will made for the spouse and minor
children.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss1/1

34

Fenn and Koren: The 1974 Florida Probate Code--A marriage of Convenience, Part 1

1974]

THE 1974 FLORIDA PROBATE CODE

erally result in a greater amount than under current law. 231 In view of McGinty, however, the question arises whether the increases are valid, because
the exemption for personal property is limited to $1,000 by the constitution.235
In a final attempt to provide for the decedent's family, the Code adopts
another modified UPC provision providing an allowance for the family's
maintenance during the administration of the estate.2 36 As with exempt property, the family allowance is not chargeable against any other benefit to which
the family is entitled, unless the will otherwise provides, and in keeping with
its concept of support, the death of any person entitled to the allowance
237
terminates the right to any unpaid amount.
This provision considerably enlarges the benefits provided by present
law, 238 for the maximum amount allowed is increased from $1,200 to $6,000,239
is not conditioned upon necessity, and is not limited to one year's support. It
is narrower than the UPC, however, for it may only be paid by court order,
after notice and a hearing,240 and is only given fourth priority in order of
payment. 241 Combined with the spouse's increased intestate share2 42 and the
increased amount of exempt property, 243 the net effect of this increase on
intestate estates is considerable. Under current law, children share equally with
the wife in the net estate above $2,200.244 Under the 1974 Code, however, an
estate of up to $32,000 could go entirely to the surviving spouse without the
234. Currently, §731.36 allows the surviving spouse of an intestate to "retain all wearing
apparel and such household goods and farming utensils, provisions and clothing as may be
necessary for the maintenance of the surviving spouse and that of the family." Under the
Florida constitution, however, this is limited to $1,000. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4.
235. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4.
236. FPC §732.403 (1974). Those entitled to the allowance are the "surviving spouse and
minor children whom the decedent was obligated to support and other children who were in
fact being supported by him." Id.
237. Id. The provision may cause an adjustment in the amount allowed by the court
and the person to whom it is paid if the spouse dies during administration of the decedent's estate, because the allowance is to be "paid to the surviving spouse, if living, for
the use of the spouse and dependent children." Id.
238. Compare FPC §732A03 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§733.20(l)(d), (0) (1973). In certain instances, the current statute allows payment of a supplemental family allowance not
exceeding $3,000. FLA. STAT. §733.20(l)(i) (1973).
239. The comparative UPC provisions, §2-403, had no limitations. In a companion provision not adopted by the Code, however, the personal representative was authorized to provide a family allowance without court approval in an amount not to exceed the same
$6,000 amount adopted by the Code. UPC §2-404.
240. FPC §732A03 (1974). See note 239 supra.
241. Id. The allowance is deferred to costs of administration, funeral expenses, and expenses of the last illness, whereas the UPC gives it priority over all "claims," which are
defined in §1-201 to include funeral expenses and expenses of administration. UPC §2-403.
242. This will generally allow the spouse to take the first $20,000 of the estate, plus onehalf of the remainder, FPC §732.102 (1974). See text accompanying notes 45-55 supra.
243. FPC §732A02 provides for up to $6,000 in exempt property. See text accompanying
notes 232-235 supra.
244. This is the total of the $1,000 of exempt property allowed under the constitution,
and the $1,200 family allowance provided by §733.20(l)(d). Unless the supplemental family
allowance of $3,000 is involved, FLA. STAT. §733.20(l)(i), the spouse and children then take
equal shares under §731.23.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

children sharing at all. This increase apparently more adequately reflects the
2 45
desire of the average intestate.
Elective Share of Surviving Spouse
At common law, the desire to protect the surviving spouse was expressed
solely by the correlative doctrines of dower and curtesyY46 This effectively
limited testamentary freedom in a land-based economy, but as the focus of
the economy shifted to an industrial society with personal and intangible
property as a source of wealth, it became apparent that the doctrines of
dower and curtesy were no longer adequate protection for the surviving
spouse.24 7 Non-community property jurisdictions soon supplemented or supplanted the doctrines with an elective statutory share in both real and personal
property, occasionally still termed "dower," 24 that was available only to the
widow.249 Additionally, as previously discussed, the devise of homestead was
restricted and provisions were made for limited support of the family that
250
could not be defeated by the will or by ordinary creditors.
Apparently concerned because the statutory share of the surviving spouse
could be defeated by use of various ownership arrangements for avoiding
probate, 25 . the drafters of the UPC adopted the unique concept of an elective
share based on both probate and nonprobate transfers.2 52 Simply stated, this
"augmented estate" is the net probate estate increased by certain inter vivos
transfers made during the marriage and reduced by the property that the
decedent had previously given the surviving spouse.2 3 As its authors themselves acknowledge, the elective share system is both controversial and complexY 54 Whether because of these problems or because it is a solution to a
problem of only slight incidence, 55 the 1974 Code rejected parts of the UPC
245. In the will studies, most decedents with estates of less than $50,000 left the entire
estate to the surviving spouse. See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
246. O'Connell & Efland, supra note 31, at 228. As developed, these doctrines gave only
the surviving spouse certain rights in realty but these could not be avoided by testamentary
disposition. Id.
247. Id. Obviously, if the bulk of wealth were represented by intangible personal property and currency, limitations on the devise of realty were no longer sufficient.
248. See FLA.STAT. §731.34 (1973).
249. O'Connell & Efland, supra note 31, at 228. In these commentators' views, this reflected "not so much the male atitude that only the woman requires protection, but rather
the economic reality that most family wealth was acquired and owned by the husband." Id.
250. Id. See text accompanying notes 232-235 supra.
251. UPC §2-202, Comment. For detailed discussion of these arrangements and the difficulties faced by a widow attempting to reach the nonprobate assets, see O'Connell & Effland,
supra note 31, at 229.
252. UPC art. 2, pt. 2.
253. UPC §2-202 and Comment. For a fuller explanation and criticism, see Clark, The
Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes To Preserve the Spouse's Elective Share; An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. REv. 513 (1970).
254. UPC art. 2, pt. 2, General Comment.
255. See Plager, The Spouse's NonbarrableShare: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33
U. CFH. L. REv. 681 (1966). The only real benefit of the UPC plan occurred when the decedent was antagonistic or the survivor grasping, that is, where the decedent tried to dis-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss1/1

36

Fenn and Koren: The 1974 Florida Probate Code--A marriage of Convenience, Part 1
1974]

THE 1974 FLORIDA PROBATE CODE

plan, inserting in its stead an arrangement of elective share provisions that are
founded in both the UPC and existing statutes, but that differ substantially
from current Florida law. The new law allows a surviving spouse to elect to
take a one-third share of the "net distributable estate," which is defined as "the
assets of the estate after payment of taxes, claims, family allowance, exempt
property and expenses of administration." 2' 56 As under existing law, the surviving spouse is entitled to homestead, exempt property, and family allowance
in addition to the elective share. 257 The deduction of the claims, family allowance, exempt property, and administration expenses before the share is computed,25 8 however, is contrary to current Florida law,2 5 9 and will greatly reduce the attractiveness of an election in testate estates. Moreover, when compared with the spouse's increased intestate share2 60 the concept of an election
against a net, rather than gross, estate should eliminate the election in intestate
estates.
Another change is that the new provision also computes the one-third
share after the payment of taxes, 2 6 1' in effect requiring the electing spouse to
pay one-third of the taxes on the estate. This seems to conffict, however, with
the last sentence of the section that states: "Nothing in this section shall require the spouse to contribute to estate or inheritance taxes if contribution
would not be required by §733.817."262 Section 733.817(2)(c) exempts from
such contribution any property qualifying for the marital deduction. As the
statutory share would generally fully qualify, the provision unnecessarily poses
an accountant's nightmare. The elective share is based on the "net distributable estate," which cannot be computed until taxes are paid. Due to the marital
deduction, however, the tax liability cannot be computed until the net amount
to be received by the spouse is known 2. 6 3 This is an unnecessary complication,
for the statutory share could always qualify for the marital deduction, 264 and
inherit the spouse or the spouse tried to get a larger portion by claiming dower after receiving large amounts of the estate by inter vivos transfer.
256. FPC §732.201 (1974).
257. Id. See FLA. STAT. §§731.34, .36 (1973). In addition, the provision concerning preexisting inchoate dower in transferred realty remains the same. Compare FPC §732.203 (1974),
with FLA. STAT. §§731.35(4), (5) (1973).
258. FPC §732.201 (1974).
259. FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1973). The section provides inter alia that "in all cases the
widow's dower shall be free from liability for all debts of the decedent [other than secured
interests] and all costs, charges, and expenses of administration." It does provide, however,
that homestead is not included in the property subject to dower. Id.
260. See text accompanying notes 45-55 supra.
261. FPC §732.201 (1974).
262. Id. Currently, FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1973), requires contribution by the widow only

when the election has the effect of increasing the estate tax.
263. See INT.

REV. CODE OF

1954, §2056(b)(4).

264. If the spouse had received assets from outside the probate estate (insurance, et
cetera), which, when combined with the statutory share would exceed 50% of the adjusted
gross estate for tax purposes, the amount that exceeded this limit would not qualify for the

marital deduction because of §2056(c). Whether the amount qualifying for the deduction
included the statutory share or whether it was considered part of the amount that exceeded
the limitation would make no difference under the apportionment statute, for the nondeductible amount would be subject to contribution under §733.817(l)(e). Therefore, the
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therefore be exempted from contribution to the estate tax by the apportionment statute. 6- 5 Therefore, the statute should be amended to delete the required deduction of taxes from the definition of net distributable estate.
If the surviving spouse decides to elect this reduced share, the 1974 Code
follows the UPC by making it explicit that the right of election may be exercised only during the spouse's lifetime.2 66 The usual time for election is reduced from seven to five months after first publication of notice to creditors,
unless litigation occurs..2 67 In such a case, the time for election is extended and
may be made within 40 days after the litigation is determined - a reduction
268
from the existing 70 days.
Except for the rejection of the augmented estate and its related provisions,
most of the 1974 Code's elective share provisions follow the UPC. There are,
however, two interesting omissions. A provision that allowed the court to extend the time of election if cause was shown was not adopted,2 6 9 apparently
because of a feeling that the occurrence of litigation was the only cause that
should justify an extension.2-0 There is less justification, however, for the
omission of a provision allowing the surviving spouse to withdraw an election.
Because the UPC requires the withdrawal to be made "before entry of a final
adjudication by the Court," 27 1 its adoption by the Code would seem to add desirable flexibility to the elective share provisions.272
statutory share could always be considered to be part of the amount qualifying for the
deduction, since in most instances the 50% limitation would not be reached if the spouse
were claiming a statutory one-third interest in the net estate.
265. FPC §733.817(2)(c) (1974).
266. FPC §732.202(1) (1974). See UPC §2-203. Existing law only requires the election to
be made in writing and signed by the widow. FLA. STAT. §731.35 (1973).
The new section follows both the UPC and the current statute by allowing an incompetent spouse's guardian to make the election subject to court order. FPC §732.202(3)
(1974). The UPC requires a finding that exercise is necessary to provide adequate support,
while the 1974 Code follows existing law allowing the order to be issued if "the best interest
of the surviving spouse may require." Id. See UPC §2-203; FLA. STAT. §731.35(3) (1973).
267. Compaie FPC §732.202(1) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.35(1) (1973). This is one
month shorter than allowed by UPC §2-205, but still allows one month after the expiration
of the shortened nonclaim period. FPC §733.701 (1974).
268. Compare FPC §732.202(2) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.35(2) (1973). As under existing law, once the election is filed, notice and a hearing are required before the court may
determine the amount of the elective share and order its payment. Compare FPC §732.204
(1974), with FLA. STAT. §§733.10-.11 (1973).
269. UPC §2-205(a).
270. This is the only situation where the statute allows an extension. FPC §732.202(2)
(1974).
271. UPC §2-205(c).
272. There are several instances in which it may be desirable to withdraw an election.
First, there could have been a misconception of the amount to be received if no election
were made. See Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 124 N.E.2d 851 (Ohio App. 1954) (revocation allowed where widow was unaware that taking under the will would result in an additional
$11,000). More importantly, it is probable that litigation either to determine the beneficiaries
or construe the will (which under §733.211, may not be filed until the will is probated) will
not be filed within five months of the notice to creditors- the usual time in which the
election must be made. Since the section did not adopt the UPC provision allowing the
court to extend this time limit if cause was shown, see note 49 supra and accompanying text,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss1/1

38

Fenn and Koren: The 1974 Florida Probate Code--A marriage of Convenience, Part 1
THE 1974 FLORIDA PROBATE CODE

Waiver of Surviving Spouse's Rights in the Estate
Prenuptial and separation agreements are covered by a new section that is
a modified version of the UPC.273 It provides that all rights to an elective
share, homestead, exempt property, and family allowance 27 4 may be waived,
wholly or partially, by a writing signed by the waiving party and that no consideration other than the execution of the agreement is necessary for its
validity. 75 The statute seems to be in accord with Florida case law in requiring "full disclosure" to the waiving party in the case of a postnuptial agreement; however, current law is considerably relaxed by the provision that "[n]o
' 27
disclosure shall be required for an agreement ...executed before marriage.V 6
The UPC draftsmen seem to contemplate the use of the prenuptial agreement only in second or later marriages, 277 but neither the UPC nor the 1974
Code provisions so limit its use. If used in first marriages or even subsequent
marriages where minor children may be expected to survive the decedent, the
agreement may complicate the setting aside of homestead, exempt property,
and the family allowance because the statutes are far from clear about what
should be done in such circumstances. Presumably because of the waiver, the
spouse would be treated as nonexistent for these purposes.278 If so, a fee simple
title to the homestead would vest immediately in the minor children and also
the ownership of the exempt property. Nevertheless, it would seem that the
court should direct payment of the family allowance to the surviving spouse

it would be desirable for the spouse to have the opportunity to withdraw an election made
within the five-month period if the result of the litigation would enable her to receive a
greater amount under the will.
273. Compare FPC §732.702 (1974), with UPC §2-204.
274. FPC §732.702(1) (1974). These rights are discussed in the text accompanying notes
224-272 supra.
275. FPC §732.702(3) (1974).
276. FPC §732.702(2) (1974). The UPC provision requires only "fair disclosure" in either
circumstance. UPC §2-204. The adoption of full disclosure for separation or postnuptial
agreements conforms with existing case law that such agreements are valid only if they
were freely and voluntarily entered into, with competent advice and with full knowledge of
the interest in the estate and its approximate worth. E.g., Horney v. Rhae, 152 Fla. 817, 12
So. 2d 302 (1943); Weeks v. Weeks, 143 Fla. 686, 197 So. 393 (1940); Tavel v. Guerin, 119
Fla. 624, 160 So. 665 (1935).
Prior to the Code, the prenuptial agreement had to meet one of three requirements: (1)
fair and reasonable in light of the rights being waived; (2) based on full and frank disclosure; or (3) absent such disclosure, based on a general and approximate knowledge of
the perspective spouse's property. E.g., DelVecchio v. DelVecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962);
Reese v. Reese, 212 So. 2d 33 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1968); Cantor v. Palmer, 166 So. 2d 466 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
277. UPC §2-204, Comment states: "The provisions . . . seem desirable in view of the
common and commendable desire of parties to second and later marriages to insure that
property derived from prior spouses passes at death to the issue of the prior spouses instead
of to the newly acquired spouse."
278. Conceivably it could be held that, because there is a surviving spouse, the condition precedent to the right of minor children to claim the exempt property and family allowance has not occurred, and, therefore, no one can claim these benefits against creditors
or testamentary beneficiaries.
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as the person having care and custody of the minor children.2 79 If this analysis
is correct, the waiver of the family allowance is largely illusory if minor or
dependent children survive the decedent.
CharitableDevises
Under the current version of the mortmain statute, most charitable devises
must be made by a will executed more than six months prior to death in order
to avoid possible invalidty. 2s ° The 1974 Code has made several changes in this
statute, 28 ' one of which poses an unnecessary problem. As amended, the statute
is now applicable only when the decedent leaves lineal descendants or a
82
spouse; the words "adopted child" in the present statute have been deleted.

This deletion seems of doubtful propriety and is likely to cause litigation.
Presumably it was thought to be redundant, but the section does not deal with
the question of intestate succession (covered by section 732.108) or of class
gifts (covered by section 732.608) and the omission here might prevent an
adopted child from taking advantage of the provisions of this section. Another
important change is the omission of the final section of the existing statute,
3
which has made it inapplicable to gifts to institutions of higher learning.28
The new provision also shortens the period for filing notice from six to four
months, consistent with the shortening of the nonclaim period and the period
in which challenges can be made to the validity of the will.2s4 Finally, it avoids

the unfortunate results of the Blankenship case 28 5 by making the section in279. "Otherwise it [the family allowance] shall be paid to the children or the person
having their care and custody." FPC §732.403 (1974).
280. FLA. STAT. §731.19 (1973).
281. FPC §732.803 (1974). Essentially, the statute provides that the lineal descendants of
the surviving spouse of a testator may avoid any charitable or religious devises, if the will
was executed within six months of death and they file notice of this fact within four months
after death. The section is not applicable if an earlier will, executed more than six months
prior to death, contained a devise substantially similar in amount or if a codicil that did not
substantially change such devise was executed within six months of death.
282. Compare FPC §732.803 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.19 (1973).
283. FLA. STAT. §731.19 (1973). Presumably such gifts were originally accepted because it
was thought that their representatives were unlikely to be in a position to unduly influence
a testator during the latter months of his life. Perhaps this reason is believed to be no longer
applicable because (a) fund raising drives are more frequent and better organized today, or
(b) that attorneys interested in institutions of higher learning are increasingly recommending
such institutions as objects of their clients' bounty.
284. See text accompanying notes
inIra (part II).
285. In re Blankenship's Estate, 122 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1960). The testatrix had executed
four wills, two of which were executed within six months of death. Despite the fact that all
four wills contained substantially the same charitable and scientific bequests, the Florida
supreme court held the gifts invalid. Applying §731.19, the court found two requirements
necessary before the gifts could be saved: "(1) The testator must have expressed substantially
the same bequest in a will executed immediately next prior to his last will, i.e., in the next
to the last will made by him, and (2) the next to the last will must have been executed at
least six months before the testator's death." Id. at 468 (emphasis in original). Because the
"next to last will" had not been executed before the six-month period, the court held the
saving clause inapplicable, even though the two earlier wills had contained substantially
similar bequests and had been executed more than six months prior to death.
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applicable if the testator made a valid charitable devise in substantially the
same amount for the same purpose or to the same beneficiary in an earlier
will or series of wills, one of which is executed more than six months prior to
288
death.
Unworthy Heirs
Generally, the worthiness of a successor is not considered and a claimant is
not barred by his misconduct toward the decedent. 28 7 In many jurisdictions,
however, claimants are prevented from sharing in an estate in three situations. -' s s The first occurs where there has been a violation of marital obligations toward the decedent; Florida case law follows this result in extreme
situations. 5- 9 The other two situations are covered by statute. Thus, denial of
paternity prevents any claim under the intestacy provisions, 290 and a convicted
murderer of the decedent s not entitled to inherit or take any devise from the
decedent's estate. 291 This treatment has been continued in the 1974 Code, 292
despite several weaknesses in the latter provision.
Both the present statute and the new provision require conviction of
murder as a condition precedent to being barred.293 Neither provision, however, defines the term "murder." Instead, the definition is left to the general
criminal law, which holds that manslaughter is not murder but a degree of
unlawful homicide.2 94 As a result, in a plea bargaining situation, a plea of
guilty to manslaughter would render the statute inapplicable, allowing the
party to "profit" from his felonious act.
This result would be avoided by the broader and more satisfactory provision of the UPC, which applies to claimants who "feloniously and intentionally . . .[kill] the decedent. 295 The UPC provision was apparently rejected because conviction was not necessary for its application. 296 Additionally,
the UPC provision specifically covers the effect of such homicide on property
286. FPC §732.803 (1974).
287. T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 147.

288. Id. at 147-48.
289. Initially, Florida courts avoided the problem. Henderson v. Chaires, 25 Fla. 26, 6

So. 164 (1889). More recently, they have held that a spouse guilty of abandonment, desertion, or bigamy is estopped from sharing in the estate. Doherty v. Traxler, 66 So. 2d 274

(Fla. 1952); Nedd v. Starry, 142 So. 2d 522 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962). However, nonpayment of

support where the parties were separated, but not divorced, does not bar the survivor's
claim. Kreisel v. Ingham, 113 So. 2d 205 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).

290. FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1973). This is continued by the 1974 Code in §732.108. See text
accompanying notes 87-96 supra.
291. FLA. STAT. §731.31 (1973).
292. FPC §§732.108, .802 (1974).
293. FPC §732.802 (1974); FLA. STAT. §731.31 (1973).
294. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 99 Fla. 1350, 126 So. 751 (1930); Folks v. State, 85 Fla.
238, 95 So. 619 (1923).
295. UPC §2-803.
296. Id. While a conviction is deemed conclusive" the UPC allows the court to determine
by a preponderance of evidence whether the killing was felonious and intentional for the
purposes of the section. UPC §2-803(e).
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appointed to the killer, joint assets, life insurance, and other beneficiary designations and "any other acquisition of property or interest by the killer."297
While some of these situations have been considered by existing case law, 298
it would seem desirable to assure uniform treatment in all of them. Therefore,
the UPC provision should be adopted, changing it, if necessary, to limit its
application to a conviction [or murder.299

Limitations by Contract
A person may limit his freedom of testation by a contract made during his
lifetime.300 This has proved a fertile area for litigation, both in Florida and
elsewhere, concerning the existence, form, and terms of the contract, as well as
the remedies available for breach.3 0 1 In an effort to reduce such litigation, a
statute was passed in 1959 making such agreements unenforceable unless in
writing and signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses.30 2 This requirement is continued in the 1974 Code, 30 3 along with a codification of existing case law that the execution of joint or mutual wills does not create a
304
presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills.
The language of the latter subdivision is taken from the UPC.3o5 It seems

unfortunate that an earlier phrase of the UPC "or contract to die intestate"306
was not also added to subsection (1). As the section now reads it seems that an
agreement not to make a will may be enforceable even though it is oral or
evidenced by a writing not signed or witnessed.
297. UPC §2-803(d). The other situations are covered in subsections (a)-(c).
298. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter, 88 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1956) (statute not applicable to insurance proceeds, but applying common law principle to deny their receipt by a beneficiary
who unlawfully and intentionally killed the decedent); Hamilton v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 207 So. 2d 472 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (same); Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla.
1951) (statute not applicable to jointly held property, but holding that a murderer can
acquire only a proportionate interest in the property).
299. Atkinson criticizes such a requirement, observing that the murderer's suicide before
conviction entitles his estate or heirs to the property. T. ATKINSON, nupra note 12, at 155.
While the same result would of course follow the murderer's death for any other reason, the
lineal descendents would be able to take the murderer's share even upon conviction through
the operation of the anti-lapse statute. Therefore, an elimination of the conviction requirement would have a different result only when the murderer left a surviving spouse, but no
lineal descendants, or when conviction was avoided due to a legal technicality.
300. McDowell v. Ritter, 153 Fla. 50, 13 So. 2d 612 (1943).
301. See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 210-27. Florida cases are collected in
34 FLA. JUR. 478-87 (1961).
302. FLA. STAT. §731.051 (1973). The statute applies only to contracts made after 1957.
FLA. STAT. §731.051(2) (1973). Therefore, specific performance is available for oral contracts
made prior to that time. Hagan v. Laragione, 205 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1967); Keith v. Culp, 111
So. 2d 278 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959). The 1974 Code drops this requirement and therefore may
be considered to apply to all such contracts.
303. FPC §732.701(1) (1974).
304. Id. This is the rule expressed in Keith v. Culp, Ill So. 2d 278 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1959); Hayes v. Jones, 122 Fla. 67. 164 So. 841 (Fla. 1935). But see Laragione v. Hagen, 195 So.
2d 246 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 205 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1968) (stating that
"the execution of mutually reciprocal wills is strong confirmatory proof that an agreement
for their execution was entered into").
305. UPC §2-701.
306. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss1/1

42

Fenn and Koren: The 1974 Florida Probate Code--A marriage of Convenience, Part 1
THE 1974 FLORIDA PROBATE CODE

1974]

"In Terrorem" Clauses
Another new provision taken from the UPC may be considered a limitation
on the freedom of testation, for it makes unenforceable any clause in a will
purporting to penalize will contests. 07 The UPC, however, limits the unenforceable nature of the clause to instances when "probable cause exists for
instituting proceedings."3 08 The omission of this phrase by the 1974 Code is
perhaps undesirable; certainly it is a change of existing case law.309 While this
provision eliminates litigation about what constitutes "probable cause," it may
have the effect of encouraging a disappointed beneficiary to use a will contest
(or the threat thereof) to establish a bargaining position.
OTHER PROVISIONS CONCERNING WILLS AND SUCCESSION

In addition to the provisions limiting testation and succession, a number
of provisions scattered through the 1974 Code affect both wills and intestacy.
Several can best be discussed by comparison.
Existence of the Beneficiary

To share in an intestate estate an heir must be in existence at the death of
the decedent. In a testate estate, existence of the devisee is required either at
the testators death or at some other relevant time specified in the will.
Whether these conditions are satisfied may be in doubt if the beneficiary is
born within nine months after the decedent's death or if he dies under such
circumstances that it cannot be determined readily whether he or the decedent died first.
Prior to the 1974 Code the problem of the afterborn heir was dealt with in
Florida by applying the general property rule that a child en ventre sa mere,
if subsequently born alive, is considered in being from the time of conception
for purposes beneficial to it.310 No Florida case has been found applying the
rule to a testamentary disposition but as a common law rule it is fully ap31 2
plicable31 ' and has been so applied in other states.
307.

FPC §732.517 (1974).

308. UPC §3-905.
309. The general rule in Florida is that an in terrorern clause will not be enforced

against a legatee who files a bill for the construction of a will or who contests it in good
faith for probable cause, unless there is a limitation over of the estate to another person.
Wells v. Menn, 158 Fla. 228, 28 So. 2d 881 (1946); Kolb v. Levy, 110 So. 2d 25 (Sd D.C.A. Fla.

1959).
310. See Shone v. Bellmore, 75 Fla. 515, 78 So. 605 (1918) (involving a child of the
decedent). Cf. Spokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla. 1968) (citing Shone
and stating that the property rights of an unborn child are contingent upon its being born

alive).
311. Blackstone says: "An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy . . .and it is
enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if
it were then actually born." 1 BLACESTONE, CoztEwNTARm I130.
312. See cases cited 4 W. BowE 9- D. PAlue: PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILtS §34.14 nA
(1961).
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The UPC elected to codify the common law rule as to heirs by providing
that afterborn relatives of the decedent that were conceived prior to his death
inherit as if they had been born in his lifetime.3 13 No similar provision as to
afterborn beneficiaries of a will is included in the UPC, the draftsmen presumably preferring to rely upon the general property rule in the more varied
fact situations possible under a will. The 1974 Code modifies the UPC provision, however, by restricting the rule to "issue" of the intestate rather than
to all relatives.3 14 Possibly this was done to reduce the evidentiary problems
attendant to proving that a relative other than "issue" had been conceived
prior to the death of the decedent. If so, it is an unneeded restriction. Whether
the afterborn child is a lineal descendant or not, it will be necessary to prove
that the child's parent predeceased the decedent in order to prevent such
parent from inheriting. 315 This proof coupled with a birth certificate showing
birth within the normal period of gestation after the parent's death is no
more than is required in the case of "issue." Even if the concern is possible
illegitimacy, this fear seems no basis for distinguishing between issue and collateral relations.
The envisioned evidentiary problems that are nonexistent in intestacy may
be present in testamentary dispositions because gifts may be made to children
of a living person. What effect the modification of the en ventre rule in the
case of intestate successors will have on the application of the rule to testamentary beneficiaries is uncertain. By its terms, the statute is clearly inapplicable, but it seems difficult to justify a different treatment of collateral relatives who take by intestacy and those taking under will provisions. For these
reasons it would seem desirable to reinstate the word "relative" in the section.
The 1974 Code does cover both the intestate and the testate situation in
its treatment of the problem of determining survivorship when the heir or
testamentary beneficiary and the decedent die under such circumstances that
it cannot be determined readily which survived. Unfortunately, however, it
represents a rejection of the more modern and practical view of the UPC in
favor of simply an edited version of the current simultaneous death provisions.316 Thus, relief from the increased cost of two administrations of the
property of the first to die in a common accident situation remains available
only when "there is insufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise
313. UPC §2-108.
314. FPC §732.106 (1974). Thus. only lineal descendants, and not collateral relatives,
would fit under this provision.
315. All the new section provides is that the afterborn issue of the decedent would
"inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent." FPC §732.106 (1974)
(emphasis added). It does not necessarily make them heirs. If the afterborn child's parent
is the mother, there could obviously be no evidentiary problem concerning the date of conception or birth, for the mother would have to die before the intestate in order for the
child to be an heir (otherwise the mother would be the heir). In that case, of course, the
child would not be afterborn at all. Even if the father were the parent, there would still
be no problem. Again, the father would have to predecease the intestate in order for the
child to be an heir. His date of death would place an outside limit on the date of conception, and as he had predeceased the intestate, that date would have to be before the
intestate's death.
316. Compare FPC §732.601(1) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §736.05 (1973).
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than simuItaneously.' 17 Florida courts, among others, have interpreted this
requirement so strictly that the section has lost its effectiveness 3 1 8 and is greatly
in need of revision.
The UPC solves this problem by requiring that any heir or devisee survive
the decedent by 120 hours. 319 Admittedly this is an arbitrary period, but it
would eliminate some of the more egregious cases of multiple administration.
Nevertheless, this requirement was rejected by the draftsmen of our code perhaps because of the arbitrary period, perhaps because it might delay
slightly the administration of the estate, or possibly because it might eliminate
a marital deduction should the surviving spouse not live for five days. 320 Only
the last reason may have merit. Although any period of time is arbitrary, it is
more likely to be readily susceptible to proof than is the test "insufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously." Additionally,
there seems to be no reason why administration could not be started within
the five-day period if desirable. Ordinarily this is not done, and, in any event,
haste should not be encouraged. Against the tax savings that might result from
the availability of the marital deduction32l should be weighed the additional
317. FPC §732.601 (1974).
318. Simultaneous death statutes were originally intended to resolve some of the difficulties that arose in determining the distribution of estates in common disaster situations.
They were prompted by the common lav rule that the length of survivorship of an heir
over a decedent was immaterial. See, e.g., Cone v. Benjamin, 157 Fla. 800, 27 So. 2d 90 (1946);
Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81 (1857) (survivorship in both cases was less than one hour). The
policy underlying the enactment of these statutes - to avoid both the almost impossible
task of proving who died first in common disaster situations, as well as the problems of two
administrations of the property of the first to die-was well expressed in Miami Beach
First Natl Bank v. Miami Beach First Nat'1 Bank, 52 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1951). Unfortunately,
however, the statute was interpreted by the same court to be applicable only in split second
survivorship situations. In other words, it was viewed as a means of simplifying evidentiary
problems. Because the wording of this statute made it applicable only when "there is no
sufficient evidence" that the parties died other than simultaneously, the problems of dual
administrations in common disaster situations are seldom avoided. In Rimmer v. Tesla, 201
So. 2d 573 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967), the court held the statute inapplicable because "the
medical proof adduced ... is sufficient to establish that Mildred Rimmer survived her husband by a time interval of at least fifteen minutes, and that their deaths were not simultaneous." Id. at 577. This literal reading of the statute reached the heights of absurdity in
a California case where the court held the act inapplicable on the basis of the coroner's
"rough estimate" that the testatrix had died 1/150,000 of a second before the beneficiary.
In re Estate of Rowley, 257 Cal. App. 2d 324, 65 Cal. Rptr. 139 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Such
interpretations simply encourage litigation; it is unlikely that they reflect the intentions of
the average victim in a common disaster situation.
319. UPC §§2-104 (heirs), 2-601 (devisees). The intestate provision is inapplicable if it
would result in escheat. The provision governing the survivorship of devisees may be varied
by the terms of the will. UPC §2-601.
320. The marital deduction may be taken only if the property actually passes to the
spouse. INT. Ru. CODE OF 1954, §2056. See note 321 infra.

1 321. Id. In large testate estates, it is common to reverse the presumption to preserve the
marital deduction and thereby reduce the decedent's taxable estate. Even in a simultaneous

death situation, this still results in a lower total tax on both estates, due to the progressive
nature of the tax rates. See note 40 supra. In estates of less than $60,000, however, there is
.no taxanvantage to be gained by -such a provision, for there would be no tax in any event
due on the specific exemption. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §2052. In such cases, .and eVen in
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costs of two administrations and the possible diversion of the decedent's property to persons other than his preferred beneficiaries. The frequency with
which similar clauses appear in willS3 22 would seem to indicate that a definite
period of survivorship would accord with many decedents' wishes.
Advancements and Satisfaction of Devises
Occasionally a decedent may make lifetime gifts to his heirs or testamentary
beneficiaries, intending them to be taken into account in making distribution
of his estate. The draftsmen of the UPC point out: "Although Courts traditionally call this 'ademption by satisfaction' when a will is involved, and 'advancement' when the estate is intestate, the difference in terminology is not
significant." 323 Nevertheless, the draftsmen bow to tradition and include separate provisions in different parts of the UPC. 32 4 The 1974 Code adopts both
UPC provisions with only editorial changes and, interestingly, includes them
in different chapters of the Code. 325 Both sections require written evidence of
the donor's intent before the lifetime transfer can be taken into account in
the distribution of the estate. This considerably restricts the common law
concepts of satisfaction and advancements, 326 as well as the current advance3 27
ments statute, under which parol evidence is acceptable to prove intent.
Although the problems do not seem to have been pressing ones to the Florida
courts, 3 28 the necessity of written proof certainly limits the potential for
future litigation. Moreover, the change reflects the modern view that "most
inter vivos transfers today are intended to be absolute gifts." 3 29 For these
reasons, the changes are useful ones that recognize the probable desires of the
average decedent.
Unfortunately, the language chosen for the satisfaction statute may not
prove felicitous. It first provides that the lifetime transfer can be treated as a
satisfaction "only if the will provides for a deduction of the lifetime gift." The
estates with relatively small taxable estates, the additional costs of two administrations
would be the predominant factor.
322. See UPC §2-104, Comment.
323. UPC §2-612, Comment.
324. UPC §§2-110 (advancements), 2-612 (satisfaction).
325. FPC §§733.806 (1974) (advancements), 732.609 (satisfaction).
326. See UPC §2-110, Comment, which also observes that the section applies only to
total intestacy.
327. FLA. STI. §734.07 (1973). Under the usual view, the question of whether an advancement had been made is determined solely by evidence concerning the subjective intent
of the decedent at the time of the transfer. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 719-22. Thus,
the new provisions "have a healthy effect of preventing speculation as to the nature of the
transaction many years after it took place." Lilly, supra note 73, at 170.
328. In the last 30 years, there has been only one Florida case litigating the issue of advancements. Livingston v. Crickenberger, 141 So. 2d 794 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962). Since 1926,
there have been only two cases involving satisfaction. Redding v. Bank of Greenville, 92
Fla. 327, 109 So. 435 (1926); In re Fancher's Estate, 17 Fla. Supp. 33 (Palm Beach County
Judge's Ct. 1960).

329. UPC §2-110, Comment. Of course, if the decedent intends otherwise he may either
execute a will stating his intentions or, less likely, may execute a writing contemporaneous
with the gift. Id.
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envisioned change in the will must be a general clause providing that a transfer after the execution of the will is to be a satisfaction.330 If so, this conflicts
with the usual view that it is the transferor's intent at the time of the transfer
that is determinative,331 a view reiterated in both statutes by the demand for
"a contemporaneous writing."
Nor does the requirement of "a contemporaneous writing" seem appropriate in the satisfaction situation, although it may be in the case of intestacy. 33 2
The writing envisioned must be one whose execution is less formal than that
of a codicil or other writing sufficient to revoke the devise in the will, yet it is
given the effect of a codicil. If such a writing, although not executed in accordance with the statute of wills, is sufficient if "contemporaneous" with the
transfer, there seems no reason why a similar writing executed at any time
subsequent to the transfer should not be given equal effect as a substitute for
a properly executed codicil revoking the devise. It would therefore seem desirable to eliminate from the satisfaction statute the reference to the provision
in the will and to allow the testator's declaration to be in "a contemporaneous
or subsequent writing." This approach would allow the testator's last written
expression of intent prior to his death to be given effect, without complying
338
with the statute of wills.
The disparate treatment of advancements and satisfactions, where the
donee of the lifetime transfer does not survive the decedent, should also be
eliminated by striking the second "not" from the final sentence of the advancement statute.334 It has already been noted that the UPC draftsmen consider
the two concepts to be opposite sides of the same coin. 33 5 Yet if a devise is
made to a son who fails to survive the testator, only the unsatisfied portion of
the devise is saved by the anti-lapse statutes for his lineal descendants.336 On
the other hand, the advancement to the same son who fails to survive the
intestate is not taken into account in computing the intestate share of the recipient's issue.3 37 This different treatment cannot be justified in terms of the
decedent's probable intent; indeed it seems that the intestate decedent is more
likely to be interested in an equal distribution of his property among his successors than the decedent who leaves a will. Equality of treatment can only
80. This must be what is meant by the statement: "Some wills expressly provide for
lifetime advances by a hotchpot clause." UPC §2-612, Comment.
31. See note 327 supra.
882. Conceptually, it is perhaps easier to justify allowing an informal writing to vary
the law of intestate succession than it is to allow such a writing to vary testamentary provisions in the face of the strict statutory requirements for the revocation of wills. Functionally, of course, there is no basis for such a distinction.
333. This would be in accord with the other relaxations of testamentary requirements
previously discussed. See text accompanying notes 136-153 supra.
334. FPC §733.806 (1974). The sentence reads: "If the recipient of the property does not

survive the decedent, the property shall not be taken into account in computing the intestate
share to be received by the recipient's descendants, unless the declaration or acknowledgment
provides othenvise." Id. (emphasis added).
35. See text accompanying note 823 supra.
336. UPC §2-612, Comment. The anti-lapse statute has been discussed in the text accompanying notes 184-190 supra.
337. FPC §733.806 (1974), quoted in note 334 supra.
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be obtained by reversing the effect of the last sentence of the advancements
statute.
Anatomical Gifts and Cremation
The need for anatomical gifts and cremation statutes stems from the common law rule that recognized no property or property rights in the body of a
'deceased person.338 Even today in the absence of statute it is doubtful to what
extent a person can control the disposition of his body after death.3 3 9 The
1974 Code carries forward the present anatomical gift law with only editorial
changes 340 and adds a new section that recognizes, at least inferentially, a
person's right to direct cremation of his body. 341 Again, a comparison of the
provisions of the latter section and those of the anatomical gift law discloses
an undesirable disparity in approach to what is basically a single problem the extent and manner in which the wishes of a person regarding the disposition of his body can be effectuated.
The anatomical gift may be effectuated by a provision in a will that, if
acted upon in good faith, is valid even though the will is later declared invalid.342 Section 732-804 merely provides "[c]remation pursuant to a provision
of a will . . . is a complete defense" for the personal representative or the

person providing the services. Without statutory reassurance like that which
appears in the anatomical gift act, no one may be willing to act until the
validity of the provision is established by the probate of the will.
While the anatomical gift may also be made by "a document other than a
will .

.

. signed by the donor in the presence of two witnesses who shall sign

the document in his presence,"3 43 provision for cremation other than in a will
may only be "pursuant to a provision of . . . any written contract signed
by the decedent in which he expressed the intent that his body be cremated .. . .,,44 Such a contract might well be signed by the decedent shortly
before death and under circumstances that might raise a question about his
capacity. Whether validity of the contract must be established before the personal representative or the person providing the services can safely act is uncertain. Furthermore, because a contract may not be amended or revoked at

338. 22 AM. JUR. 2d 557 (1965).
339. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 747, 748 (1966).
340. Compare FPG §§732.1001-8 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§736.20-.28 (1973). Several
definitions in §736.22 are eliminated in §732.1002 presumably because they were thought to
be unnecessary. Two related sections concerning eye banks (§736.39) and enucleation of
eyes (§736.31) were also reenacted, with editorial changes, as FPC §§732.1009-.1010.
341. FPC §732.804 (1974).
342. FPC §732.1005(1) (1974).
343. FPC §732.1005(2) (1974).
344. FPC §732.804 (1974). FLA. STAT. §733.601 provides that the named executor may
carry out these instructions before appointment. While the section does not limit "written
instructions of the decedent relating to his body" to a will or written contract, it may well
be that the general language of the section would have to give way to the specific language
regarding cremation contained in §732.804.
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the option of one of the parties, the decedent is more restricted in changing
34 5
his mind in the case of cremation than in making an anatomical gift.
There seems no reason for distinguishing between the manner for expressing or revoking an intent to be cremated and that needed for an anatomical gift. Section 732.804 should be revised to include an adapted version of
the well thought-out provisions of the anatomical gift act, thus allowing a
person equal freedom to provide for cremation of his body. 40
Aliens
The alien provision of the new law is a verbatim adoption of the 'UPG,
simply providing that no person is disqualified to inherit because of his, or
his ancestor's alienage . 47 To a certain extent this is a substantive change in
the current law, because of the elimination of the so-called "iron curtain"
provision,3 45 due to its doubtful constitutionality. 49 As a result, alienage is
no longer of any consequence in the law of wills or of intestacy.
345. See FPC §732.1007 for the extremely liberal provisions for amending or revoking
an anatomical gift.
346. Such an adaptation might read as follows:
732.804 Provisionsrelating to cremation.-(1) A person may express his intent that his body be cremated:
(a) by a provision in his will. The provision becomes effective upon the death of
the testator without waiting for probate. If the will is not probated, or if it is declared invalid for testamentary purposes, the provision is nevertheless valid if it has
been acted upon in good faith.
(b) by a document other than a will signed by the donor in the presence of two
witnesses who shall also sign the document.
(2) A person may amend or revoke an expression in a will or other document of intent that his body be cremated:
(a) in the manner provided for amendment or revocation of wills; or
(b) by a signed statement found on his person or in his effects; or
(c) by an oral statement made in the presence of two persons; or
(d) by a statement during a terminal illness or injury addressed to an attending
physician.
(3) Any person who acts in good faith and without negligence in accordance with the
last known expression of intent as to cremation is not liable for damages in any civil
action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his acts.
Subdivision (3) is derived from §732.1008(3).
347. Compare FPC §732.110 (1974), with UPC §2-112.
348. FLA. STAT. §731.28(2) (1973) provides for payment into the state treasury whenever
an alien resides in a territory outside the United States and "would not have the benefit or
the use or control of property due him and that special circumstances make it desirable that
delivery to him be deferred."
There is also another, less important, change from the existing statute; it no longer refers to an alien being entitled to "devise, bequest . . . or transmit inheritance." FLA. STAr.
§731.28(1) (1973). Because there is no statutory bar to aliens' actions in this regard, this
change is of little importance. The Florida constitution provides: "All natural persons are
equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right . . . to acquire,
possess, and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and
possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regnlated or prohibited by law." FLA. CONsT. arL I, §2. As the legislature does not "regulate or prohibit"
disposition of property there would appear to be no bar for these actions. Apparently, one
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Disclaimer
The right of a beneficiary to disclaim his interest in either a testate or
intestate estate merits mention because of its importance as a tool in postmortem planning. The new provision requires no discussion here, however,
because it is merely a continuation of existing law with editorial changes. s50
reason the UPC included this provision was to continue the effort to eliminate the distinction between real and personal property (a distinction already eliminated in Florida). The
comment to §2-112 states: "The purpose of this section is to eliminate the ancient rule that
an alien cannot acquire or transmit land by descent, a rule based on the feudal notions of
the obliagtion of the tenant of the King." UPC §2-112, Comment.
349. The possible unconstitutionality of similar state statutes was recognized by the
drafters of the UPC in their comment to the provision on alienage:
"This section has broader vitality in light of the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct. 664, 389 U.S. 429, 19 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1968)
holding unconstitutional a state statute providing for escheat . . . [under requirements
similar to the current Florida statute]. The rationale was that such a statute involved the
local probate court in matters which essentially involve United States foreign policy,
whether or not there is a governing treaty with the foreign country. Hence, the statute is
,an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts
to the President and the Congress.'" UPC §2-112, Comment.
350. Compare FPC §732.801 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §731.37 (1973). For a detailed discussion of the use of disclaimer as an estate planning tool, see FLORIDA WILL DRAFINC AND
ESTATE PLANNING

§13.36 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ. 1972).
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APPENDIX A
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FERcES F ROm

1973

FLORIDA STATUTES TO COMPARABLE SECTIONS OF CHAPTER

74-106

Note: Many of the listed sections have undergone substantive change. Those not
listed do not appear in chapter 74-106.
1973
Chapter 74-106
Sections
Sections
690.02
690.03
690.04
690.05
690.06
690.07
690.08
690.09
690.10
690.11
690.12
690.13
690.14
691.03
691.04
691.11
691.12
691.13
691.14
691.15
691.16
691.17
691.18
691.19
691.20
691.21
691.22
731.01
731.03
731.04
731.05
731.051
731.07
731.071
731.10
731.101
731.11
731.12
731.13
731.14
731.15
731.16
731.17
731.18
731.19
731.20
731.21
731.23

737.601
737.602, .615
737.603
737.604
737.606
737.607
737.608
737.608
737.609
737.611
737.612
737.613
737.614
737A01, A02
737A02, A04
737.501
737.502
737.503
737504
737-505
737.506
737.507
737.508
737.509
737.510
737.511
737.512
731.101
731.201
731.501
732.516, .602
732.701
732.502
732.503
732.301
732-507
732.302
732505
732.505
732.506, .507
732508
732-509
732.510
732511
732.803
732.603, .604
732514, 733.102
732.102, .103

1973
Chapter 74-106
Sections
Sections
731.24
731.25
731.27
731.28
731.29
731.30
731.31
731.33
731.34
731.35
731.36
731.37
732.06
732.09
732.14
732.21
732.22
732.23
732.24
732.26
732.27
732.28
732.30
732.31
732.32
732.33
732.34
732.35
732.37
732.42
732.43
732.44
732A5
732A6
732.47
732.49
732.51
732.52
732.55
732.61
732.63
732.64
732.65
732.66
732.67
732.68
732.69
733.01
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732.105
732.104
732A01
732.110
732.108
732.108
732.802
732.107
732.201
732.202, .203
732A02
732.801
733.101
731.301, .302
733.106
733.501
732.901
733.202
733.201
733.103
733.207
733.210
733.109
733.107
733.208
733.902
733.204
733.206.
733.205
733.211
733.202, .203
733.301
733.302
733.303
733.304
733.305
733.306
733.307
733.308
733.402
733.403
733A03'
733.403, A04
733.403
733.402
733.405
733A03
733.607, .608, 737.605(2)
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1973
Chapter 74-106
Sections
Sections

1973
Chapter 74-106
Sections
Sections

733.03
733.05
733.08
733.15
733.16
733.17
733.18
733.19
733.20
733.21
733.211
733.22
733.23
733.225
733.31
733.32
733.361
733.38
733.39
733.40
733.41
733.42
733.52
733.53
734.01
734.02
734.03
734.031
734.041
734.05
734.051
734.06
734.07
734.09
734.10
734.11
734.12
734.13
734.14
734.15
734.16
734.22
734.221
734.25
734.26
734.27
734.29
734.30
734.31
734.32
735.01
735.02
735.04
735.05

735.051
735.07
735.09
735.10
735.11
735.14
735.15
736.05
736.06
736.17
736.172
736.21
736.22
736.23
736.24
736.25
736.26
736.27
736.28
736.29
736.31
744.01
744.03
744.05
744.10
744.11
744.13
744.14
744.15
744.16
744.18
744.19
744.21
744.24
744.25
744.26
744.27
744.30
744.31
744.315
744.33
744.34
744.35
744.36
744.38
744.40
744.42
744.43
744.47
744.48
744.481
744.482
744.483
744.484

733.604
733.605
733.612
733.701
733.702,
733.704
733.705
733.706
732.403,
733.708
733.709
733.613
733.613
733.613
733.610
733.612
733.612
733.612
733.612
733.612
733.611
733.611
733.609
733.609
733.605,
733.801
733.802
733.810
733.817
733.805
733.803
733.807
733.806
733.502
733.503
733.504
733.505
733.506
733.507
733.508
733.509
733.901
733.816
733.105
733.903
733.104
733.108,
734.101
734.102
734.103
735.201
735.102,
735.301
735.203,

.703

733.707

.617

734.103

.202
.204
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735.205
735.206
735.207
735.208
735.207
735.209
735.302
732.601
734.104
732.513
733.808
732.1001
732.1002
732.1003
732.1004
732.1005
732.1006
732.1007
732.1008
732.1009
732.1010
744.101
744.102
744.103
744.201
744.202
744.301
744.302
744.306
744.307
744.308
744.308
744.308
744.308
744.308
744.308
744.309
744.310
744.310
744.310
744.310
744.311
744.312
744.401
744.402
744.313
744.403
744.404
744.105
744.203
744.204
744.205
744.204
744.206
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1973
Chapter 74-106
Sections
Sections

1973
Chapter 74-106
Sections
Sections

744.49
744.50
744.51
744.52
74453
744.54
744.59
744.60
744.601
744.61
744.62
744.64
744.65
744.66
744.68
745.01
745.02
745.03
745.05
745.06
745.07
745.09
745.11
745.12
745.14
745.15.
745.16

744.501(1)
745.17
744.501(1)
745.18
744.501(15)
745.19
744.501(19)
745.20
744.507
745.21
745.23
744.501(20)
745.25
744.323
745.26
744.324
745.27
744.324
745.28
744.325
745.29
744.326
745.30
744.327
745.33
744.322
746.01
744.405
746.02
744.406
746.03
744A07
746.04
744.408
746.05
744.409
746.06
744.410
746.07
744All
746.08
744.411
746.12
744.412
746.121
744.413
746.13
744.414
746.14
744.415
FLA. CoNsr. 732.516
art. X, §4(c)

744.203
744.207, .502(8)
744.314
744.314
744.314
744.315
744.316
744.317
744.317
744.318
733.319
744.320
744.321
744.501(16)
744.501(21)
744.501(5)
744.501(6)
744.501(2), (17), (18)
744.501(15)
744.503
744.503
744.504
744.501(15)
744.501(15)
744.505
744.506
744.501(1)
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APPENDIX
THE

1974 FLORIDA

PROBATE CODE:

TITLES,

[Vol. XXVII

B*
SOURCES,

AND ARTICLE

REFERENCES

Note: Many procedural provisions have been omitted from the 1973 "source" statutes
and there have been editorial changes made in almost all sections. These changes are not
mentioned; when changes are noted (chgs.), they are believed to be substantive. Article
references refer to both the text and footnotes accompanying the designated footnote
numbers.
1974 Code
Section

lfitle

Source

731.101

Short title

UPC §101;
F.S. §731.01

nn. 8-10

732.101

Intestate estate

UPC §2-101

n. 45

732.102

Share of spouse

UPC §2-102 (chgs.);
see F.S. §731.23

nn. 45-55,
242-245

732.103

Share of other heirs

UPC §2-103 (chgs.);
F.S. §731.23 (chgs.)

nn. 50-66, 79-80

732.104

Inheritance per stirpes

F.S. §731.25

nn. 42, 50

732.105

Half-blood

F.S. §731.24

nn. 44, 69, 218

732.106

Afterborn heirs

UPC §2-108 (chgs.)

nn. 311-315

732.107

lI.scheat

F.S. §731.33 (chgs.);
see UPC §2-105

nn. 44, 61

732.108

Adopted persons & persons

born out of wedlock

UPC §2-109; see
F.S. §§731.29, .30

nn. 70-96, 217-219,
283, 290, 292

732.109

Debts of decedent

UPC §2-111

nn. 189-190

732.110

Aliens

UPC §2-112;
see F.S. §731.28

nn. 347-349

732.111

Dower & curtesy abolished

UPC §2-113

732.201

Right to elective share

UPC §2-201 (chgs.);
see F.S. §731.34

nn. 176,
246-263

732.202

Election to take elective
shares

UPC §2-203;
F.S. §731.35

nn. 176,
266-272

732.203

Preexisting right to dower

F.S. §731.35(4)

in. 176, 257

732.204

Proceedings on the election

UPC §2-205(d) (chgs.)

nn. 176, 266-272

732.301

P1retermitted spouse

F.S. §731.10;
UPC §2-302

nn. 156,
163-167

732.302

P'reterInitted children

F.S. §731.11 (chgs.);
UPC §2-302

nn. 156,
163-168

732A01

Descent of homestead

F.S. §731.27

nn. 55,
227-230

732.402

Exempt property

UPC §2-402 (chgs.);
F.S. §731.36

nn. 55, 231-235,
243
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1974 Code
Section

Title

732.403

Family allowance

Source

Article
Reference

UPC §2-403 (chgs.);

no. 55, 236-245,

see F.S. §733.20

279

732.501

Who may make a will

UPC §2-501;
see F.S. §731.04

n. 100

732.502(1)

Execution of wills

F.S. §§731.07(1), (2)
(chgs.)

nn. 104, 107-135

732502(2)

F.S. §731.07(3) (chgs.)

nn. 123-125

732502(3)

F.S. §731.07(5)

no. 113, 119

732.502(4)

F.S. §731.07(6)

732.502(5)

F.S. §731.07(7)

n. 106
nn. 126-135

732.503

Self-proof of will

F.S. §731.071 (chgs.);
UPC §2-504 (chgs.)

732.504(1)

Who may witness

UPC §2-505(a)

732.504(2)

UPC §2-505(b) (chgs.)

n. 119

732.505

Revocation by writing

F.S. §§731.12, .13;
see UPC §2-507(1)

no. 154, 160

732.506

Revocation by act

F.S. §731.14(1);
see UPC §2-507(2)

nn. 155, 160

732.507

Effect of subsequent marriage,
birth, or dissolution of
marriage

F.S. §§731.14(2), .101;
see UPC §2-508

no. 156, 169-176

732.508

Revival by revocation

F.S. §731.15 (chgs.)

nn. 177-180

732509

Revocation by codicil

F.S. §731.16

n. 177

732.510

Republication of wills by
codicil

F.S. §731.17

n. 177

732511

Republication of wills by
reexecution

F.S. §731.18

n. 177

732.512

Incorporation by reference

UPC §2-510

nn. 136-140

732.513

Devises to trustees

F.S. §736.17;
see UPC §2-511

nn. 143-144

732.514

Vesting of devises

F.S. §731.21

732.515

Separate writing identifying
devises of tangible property

UPC §2-513 (chgs.)

nn. 150-153

732.516

Devise of homestead

FLA. CONsT. art. X,
§4(c), as amended, F.S.
§731.05

nn. 227-230

732.517

Penalty clause for contest

UPC §3-905 (chgs.)

nn. 307-309

732.601

Simultaneous death law

F.S. §736.05

nn. 181, 211, 316322
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1974 Code
Section

Article
Reference

Title

Source

732.602

Construction that will
passes all property

UPC §2-604;
see F.S. §731.05(2)

nn. 183, 212

732.603

Anti-lapse; deceased devisee;
class gifts

UPC §2-605 (chgs.)

nn. 184-190

732.604

Failure of testamentary
provision

UPC §2-606;
see F.S. §731.20(2)

n. 185

732.605

Change in securities;
accessions; nonademption

UPC §2-607 (chgs.)

nn. 191-198

732.606

Nonademption of specific
devises in certain cases; sale
by guardian of the property;
unpaid proceeds of sale,
condemnation, or insurance

UPC §2-608

nf. 197, 199-210

732.607

Exercise of power of
appointment

UPC §2-610

n. 214

732.608

Construction of generic
terms

UPC §2-611 (chgs.)

nn. 216-220, 283

732.609

Ademption by satisfaction

UPC §2-612

nn. 211, 323-337

732.610

I)e%ises to be per stirpes

New

nf. 221-222

732.701(l)

Agreements concerning
succession

F.S. §731.051

nf. 300-306

UPC §2-701

nn. 300-306

UPC §2-204 (chgs.)

nn. 273-279

New

nn. 273-276

732.701(2)
732.702(1)

Waiver of right to elect
& of other rights

732.702(2), (3)
732.801

Disclaimer of interests in
property passing by will or
by intestate succession or
under certain powers of
appointment

F.S. §731.37

n. 350

732.802

Murderer

F.S. §731.31

nn. 251-299

732.803

Charitable devises

F.S. §731.19 (chgs.)

nn. 113, 280-286

732.804

Provisions relating to
cremation

New

nn. 338-346

732.901

Production of wills

F.S. §732.22

732.1001-.1010

Anatomical gifts

F.S. §§736.21-.31

nn. 338-346

733.601

Time of accrual of duties &
powers

UPC §3-701

n. 344

733.701

Notice to creditors

F.S. §733.15(1):
UPC §3-801

n. 267
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1974 Code
Section

Title

Source

733.806

Advancement

UPC §2-110;
see F.S. §734.07

nn. 323-337

733.817

Apportionment of estate
taxes

F.S. §734.041
(possible chgs.)

nn. 262-265

*This

Article
Reference

appendix covers only those sections of the 1974 Code that are discussed in this

portion of the article. The remaining sections will be indexed in part II of this article.
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